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The impact of pension information on market valuation is an important issue 
that has not to date been explored in depth.  I investigate how the market, analysts and 
institutional investors respond to mandatory pension contributions to gain insight on 
the utilization of pension information. Using plan-level pension Form 5500 Schedule 
B data, I find that firms that make mandatory contributions frequently have lower 
market returns than those that make mandated contributions for shorter periods. I 
classify mandatory contribution (MC)  firms into three groups: Lenient (LEN), 
Perpetual (PER) and Revert (REV) firms based on factor and cluster analyses that 
capture different MC characteristics, and show that market responses vary 
systematically across the identified groups of MC firms. I also find evidence that 
analysts take MC into consideration but are unable to fully understand the implications 
of different MC patterns, resulting in larger forecast errors for some MC group firms 
than for others. Finally, I demonstrate that institutional investors take MC into 
consideration two years after the firm’s first MC occurrence. Institutional investors 
react to the MC firm groups differently depending on the investing class and style. 
These findings suggest that the responses of the market, analysts and institutional 
investors depend on the nature of the MC patterns exhibited by different firms. 
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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
 
U.S. companies that sponsor defined benefit (DB) pension plans are required by 
law to make a mandatory contribution (MC) to the plan if the plan’s underfunded level is 
below certain limits.  Past research (e.g., Picconi (2004); Coronado et al. (2008)) suggests 
that the implications of pension accounting information in footnotes accompanying 
financial statements are not fully understood by market participants. MCs have a direct 
cash flow impact on companies (Rauh, 2006). It is therefore particularly important to 
understand the performance and valuation implications of MCs, and how different MC 
characteristics (MC period length, continuous vs. interrupted MC strings) are associated 
with performance and valuation. These are the hitherto unanswered questions that this 
study addresses. 
Using plan-level pension Form 5500 Schedule B data from the Department of 
Labor (1991-2005), I identify 2,667 firms that make mandatory pens ion contributions 
over a period ranging from one year to 15 years. Combining the pension data of these 
firms with financial information from Compustat, stock information from CRSP, analyst 
information from I/B/E/S and institutional holdings information from CDA/Spectrum 13f 
data, I investigate stock market reactions, analyst forecasts and revisions and institutional 
holdings for these firms over the sample period. Instead of using firm-year groupings, I 
group my firms by MC attributes (e.g., length of MC period, distance between non-
consecutive MC strings) to gain deeper insight into the impact of MC for the firm.   
Overall, results show that firms that are not required to make any mandatory 
pension contribution during the sample period are associated with higher returns (raw, 
size-adjusted or risk-adjusted) than firms that make mandatory contributions over a 
period longer than one year. These findings are consistent with prolonged MC periods 
being an indicator of decreased financial resources and poorer future prospects for the 
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firm.  
Analysts seem to incorporate some of the MC information into earnings forecast 
but can’t differentiate between different MC characteristics, resulting in larger forecast 
errors for firms with more protracted MC strings. Forecast accuracy decreases and 
forecast revision increases as the length and complexity of the MC string increases. 
Institutional investors seem to recognize the implications of MC two years after the first 
MC occurrence.  Depending on the investment class and style, institutional investors’ 
responses to MC vary across various MC firm groups. The quasi-indexers, large value 
and large growth investors can differentiate between firms with more serious funding 
shortfalls and other MC firm groups, and hold substantial fewer shares in the former. 
Transient investors also hold reduced shares in firms with more serious funding 
shortfalls.  However, dedicated and small investors don’t treat different MC firm groups 
differently.   
This paper makes several contributions to existing literature. It is the first study to 
analyze the link between MC patterns and firm performance and valuation. It makes a 
significant contribution to the pension literature and augments the literature on market 
efficiency and efficient valuation. 
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CHAPTER 2 
BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1. Mandatory Pension Contributions  
The U.S. employer sponsored retirement system has evolved significantly over 
the past 125 years. Today it is a vital component of American’s $10 trillion retirement 
market (McCourt, 2006).  Although there is an increasing trend towards shifting from 
defined benefit (DB) plans to defined contribution (DC) plans (Mitchell, 2002), DB plans 
still account for a significant portion of total pension assets. According to a U.S. 
Department Labor annual report (Private Pension Plan Bulletin, March 2007), at the end 
of year 2004 the total asset of DB plans with 100 or more participants stood at $2.08 
trillion, close to the $2.13 trillion of total assets of DC plan with 100 or more participants.  
DB pension plans once again are of special interest to investors, lawmakers, 
accounting standard setters, and participants, at least in part because of the estimated 
overall funding shortfall following the 2002-2004 stock market decline period, during 
which DB plans experienced a $400 billion deterioration. Consequently, many DB 
pension plans shifted from an overfunded status to an underfunded status.  
To protect employees’ retirement benefit, the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act (ERISA) of 1974 instituted a minimum funding requirement for 
underfunded plans. ERISA rules require that the sponsors of underfunded plans must 
make annual installment payments on any unfunded liability in addition to contributing 
an amount equal to the present value of pension benefits accrued during the year.  
The Pension Protection Act of 1987 further tightened the funding requirement 
rules of DB plans, requiring underfunded plan to deposit between 13.75%-30% of any 
underfunding as a “catch-up” or deficit reduction contribution (DRC). The larger the 
funding deficit, the higher the percentage of the deficit that must be contributed in the 
first year, with the remainder being amortized over three to five years (Rauh, 2006).  
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The 1994 Retirement Protection Act (RPA) further tightened funding 
requirements. It increased the minimum DRC rate from rate from 13.75% to 18% for 
years beginning after January 1, 1995. However, it exempted plans that are more than 
90% funded, as well as plans that are funded between 80% and 90%, provided that those 
plans were at least 90% funded in two consecutive years out of the preceding three years.  
Firms that fail these funding criteria must make mandatory contributions to 
reduce their pension liability. The MC could have a large impact on a firm’s cash flow 
that in turn could limit its capacity to invest and expand.  Rauh (2006) first examines MC 
effects on capital expenditure. Using the schedule B data from 1990 to 1998, he finds that 
firms’ capital expenditure decline when MC requirements come into play, even when 
controlling for correlations between the pension funding status itself and the firm’s 
unobserved investment opportunities. The decline is sharper for firms that appear more 
constrained or more dependent on external finance.  Previous findings show that capital 
expenditures are value-relevant. Callen et al (1996) find that firms with large ratios of 
current to prior four-year average capital expenditures experience positive current-period 
abnormal returns. Lev and Thiagarajan (1993) document that capital expenditures are 
value-relevant after controlling for industry differences. Kim (2001) examines the 
relation between capital expenditures and future earnings after controlling for the effect 
of previous capital expenditures and other possible omitted variables. He finds that firms 
with (without) at least one year of losses in the next five years exhibit a strong negative 
(positive) linear association between capital expenditures and future earnings. These 
results imply that MC could adversely influence firms’ earnings and returns by impacting 
capital expenditures.    
Franzoni (2008), using the same data set as Rauh (2006), investigates whether the 
sensitivity of investment to financial slack depends on firms’ funding status, 
underinvestment or overinvestment. He finds that the market reacts significantly more 
strongly to a drop in cash that affects a financially constrained firm. His results also show 
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that for firms with entrenched managers and less institutional presence, the price reaction 
to a given drop in cash is significantly smaller in absolute value, consistent with empire-
building theories. Since his main interest is to test whether the price reaction to MC is 
associated with financial constraints or to empire building, Franzoni (2008) does not 
investigate the effect of MC on investor valuation. Furthermore, his data is limited to a 
relatively short period from 1990 to 1998.  
 
2.2. Market Reactions, Analyst Forecasts and Institutional Holdings 
SFAS 87 requires firms to report meaningful information about their pension 
plans in detailed footnotes when filing financial reports. This should allow investors to 
obtain information on pension fund performance and condition. However, as pointed out 
by Peter Fortune (2005), only financial analysts and attentive investors, skilled at 
decoding accounting statements, can scrutinize the notes to corporation’s financial 
statements and adjust both income statements and balance sheets to reflect the actual state 
of DB pension plans. Part of the complexity arises because of the SFAS 87 smoothing 
assumptions (meant to prevent the financial statements of firms from being severely 
influenced by the high volatility of pension earnings), and the fact that DB plans are 
subject to three separate sets of regulations, GAAP as laid out in SFAS 87 and SFAS 132 
for financial reporting, Section 412 of tax codes and rules of Pension Benefit Guaranty 
Corporation (PBGC) for insurance premiums (Picconi, 2004).  As a result, pension 
accounting seems complex and confusing and required adjustments may not be fully 
embedded into market prices. Shareholders might incorrectly assess the current state of 
the firm’s finances. Coronado and Sharpe (2003) find that investors appear to incorrectly 
judge the permanence of pension earnings and therefore treat pension earnings as core 
earnings, resulting in firm overvaluations. Even as DB pension plans have gained great 
attention in recent years since the burst of market bubble caused the funding status of 
pensions to change from surpluses to huge deficits, investors still misprice pension plan 
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firms. Coronado et al. (2008) test whether increased investor attention to pension account 
information has eliminated systematic mispricing in recent years.  They show that 
investors continue to misvalue DB pensions, i.e., equity prices of firms still fail to reflect 
the true economic value of pension assets and liabilities.   
Davis-Friday, et al. (1999) investigate the valuation of post retirement benefit 
(PRB) liabilities and find that PRB liabilities receive greater weight when recognized 
than disclosed. Franzoni and Martin (2006) study market efficiency and pension plan 
funding by examining the market response to firms with underfunded and overfunded DB 
pension plans. They find that firms with severely underfunded pension plans are 
significantly overvalued by the market.  Liu and Tonks (2009) study the relationship 
between pension fund deficits and stock market efficiency in the UK and find that firms 
with better funded pension schemes earn higher return regardless of the size of the firm 
and firms with the severely underfunded pension schemes earn negative abnormal returns 
even for firm with high book-to-market ratio.  
Plumlee (2003) shows that analysts’ assimilation and weighting of the 
information can be affected by the complexity of disclosed information. Picconi (2004) 
finds that both analysts and investors fail to incorporate information that is already 
available in the pension notes. Investors tend to fully incorporate the portion of a firm’s 
funded status that has been recognized as income but to improperly weight the off-
balance sheet liability that is disclosed in the footnotes.  Since analysts are specialized 
financial professionals and serve as intermediaries between firms and the market, their 
forecasts represent a good proxy for the market’s expectation of future earnings (La Port 
1999) and serve as an mechanism for stock price discovery (Gleason and Lee, 2003). 
Thereafter, Chen et al. (2008) employ analyst forecast errors and revisions to investigate 
whether stock returns fully reflect the implications of pension underfunding and find that 
analysts underreact to the information content of pension underfunding and fail to 
anticipate the decline in future earnings and cash flows for firms that experience seriously 
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underfunded pensions when they forecast corporate earnings.  
Institutional investors are sophisticated and responsible for large amounts of 
money. Therefore, they are likely to pay more attention to the firms they are going to 
invest in or that they currently hold. Since they buy or sell large volumes of shares, their 
movements have an impact on the managers of the firms as well as the stock market. 
Bushee (1998) shows that managers are significantly less likely to cut R&D to reverse 
earning decline when institutional ownership is high. Hribar, Jenkins and Wang (2006) 
examines how institutional investors respond to accounting restatements and find that 
transient investors reduce their holdings in a restating firm at least one quarter prior to the 
quarter of the restatement. Franzoni (2008) investigates firms with pension plans and 
finds that overinvested firms appear to be larger, older, more covered by analysts and 
rating agencies, and to display less institutional ownership. These studies show that 
institutional investors not only discern firm “types” and adjust their holding levels 
accordingly, but they also influence the behavior of the firm that could in turn affect the 
performance of pension fund and market returns.   
In summary, the existing literature reveals that pension accounting is complex and 
opaque, and thus impacts market assessment of the value of the company. Underfunded 
DB plans seem to contribute the firms’ low market returns, decrease analysts’ forecasting 
accuracy and possibly affect institutional holdings. However, there is little evidence on 
how professional market participants such as analysts and institutional investors respond 
to MC.  This study attempts to fill this gap by investigating the effects of MC on stock 
market returns, analyst forecasts and institutional holdings using the actuarial mandatory 
contribution defined as “Additional Required Funding Charge” from schedule B of Form 
5500 filed by firms from 1991 through 2005. This is a more direct measure of the 
additional mandated contribution than that used by the two studies discussed earlier  
(Rauh 2006 and Franzoni 2008).    
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CHAPTER 3 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 Data Descriptions  
Data used in this study have been collected from several sources. I first obtain the 
plan mandatory contribution information from schedule B of Form 5500 filed with the 
Department of Labor from1991 through 2005, and then merge the data with financial 
statement data from Standard Poor’s Compustat, stock market data from Center for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP), analyst forecast data from Thomas Reuters’ I/B/E/S, 
and institutional holdings data from Thomson Reuters’ CDA/Spectrum Institutional (13f) 
Holdings. All firms, no matter whether publicly traded or privately owned, have to file 
Form 5500 every year for every pension benefit plan, welfare plan, fringe benefit plan 
and direct filing entity. The employer or plan administrator of defined benefit plan that is 
subject to the minimum funding status must file Schedule B of Form 5500 for the plan 
year to report the plan’s actuarial information. The actuary must certify the minimum 
required contribution (MRC)
1
 to prevent an accumulated funding deficiency in the plan’s 
Funding Standard Account (FSA). The MRC is generally equal to the sum of the “normal 
cost” (the present value of pension benefits accrued during the year) and the amortized 
amount of accrued liability, reduced by the FSA credit balance.  
The FSA is used to track contributions made by a plan sponsor in excess of the 
MRC. Then the actuary determines the plan’s additional required funding charge based 
on the “Gateway” percentage, defined as a proportion of plan’s current assets to its 
current liabilities.  If the plan is underfunded and its Gateway percent is below the 
specified level, it is subject to the DRC requirement, as discussed earlier.  The additional 
funding charge is then calculated as the excess of the DRC over the sum of various 
                                              
1
 The MRC is the “Amount of contribution certified by the actuary as necessary to reduce the funding 
deficiency to zero” derived from the FSA statement in Schedule B.  
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charges and credits in the FSA, adjusted for any “unpredictable contingent event amount” 
for the plan year.  For a plan that has more than 100 but fewer than 150 participants the 
additional funding charge is further reduced 2 percent for each participant less than 150.  
The adjusted additional funding charge, reported on line 13 of Schedule B for years 
before 1995 and on the last line in part II of Schedule B since 1995, is my mandatory 
contribution (MC) variable.  
I then aggregate the plan-year MC to firm-year level. Panel A of Table 1 shows 
the number of firms and large plans in Schedule B of 5500 from 1991 to 2005.  Only 
partial data were available for the year 2005 at the time these data were collected from 
the Department of Labor. Although it fluctuates from year by year, the number of firms 
sponsoring large DB plans with 100 or more participants shows a decreasing trend, from 
14,807 firms in 1991 to 10,547 in 2004. However, the average number of plans per firm 
over the period remains stable with the overall average of 1.4 plans per firm.  
Panel B of Table 1 shows the number of firms with large plans in Schedule B of 
Form 5500 from 1991 to 2005, after merging with Compustat data.  Only 13.9% firm-
years in Panel A remain in Compustat, implying that most of the firms that filed Schedule 
B of Form 5500 are private firms. However, the average number of plans per firm 
increases to 1.9, indicating that the public traded firms sponsor more DB plans than 
private firms.  
 
3.2. Pension Variable Definitions  
The pension variables used throughout this paper are defined in Table 2.  Panel A 
lists variables derived from Compustat data, Panel B lists variables obtained from 
Schedule B of Form 5500 and Panel C lists variables calculated from both Compustat and 
Schedule B of Form 5500. 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for Firms with Defined Benefit (DB) Plans with 100 
or More Participants (Schedule B of Form 5500). 
 
Panel A.  Before Merging with Compustat Data.     
Year  Number of Number of        
Average 
Plans                 Number of plans per firm      
   Firms Plans Per Firm Min   Max  Std                   
       
       
1991 14807 19646 1.3268 1 59 1.4283 
1992 10482 13735 1.3103 1 36 1.3012 
1993 13912 18193 1.3077 1 57 1.3823 
1994 11062 14522 1.3128 1 57 1.3770 
1995 13062 16888 1.2929 1 50 1.2074 
1996 12728 16325 1.2826 1 34 1.1208 
1997 12191 15625 1.2817 1 30 1.0842 
1998 11673 14830 1.2705 1 29 1.0526 
1999 10120 13928 1.3763 1 31 1.2476 
2000 12052 16077 1.3340 1 27 1.1456 
2001 11607 15226 1.3118 1 40 1.1010 
2002 11059 14749 1.3337 1 29 1.0980 
2003 10951 17812 1.6265 1 32 1.3472 
2004 10547 16959 1.6079 1 39 1.2701 
2005   3445   4632 1.3446 1 31 1.1122 
Overall 169698 229147 1.3503 1 59 1.2373 
 
Panel B.  After Merging with Compustat Data.     
Year  Number of Number of        
Average 
Plans                 Number of plans per firm      
   Firms Plans Per Firm Min  Max Std                   
1991 2001 4074 2.0360 1 59 2.9364 
1992 1523 2968 1.9488 1 36 2.5661 
1993 1955 3786 1.9366 1 57 2.6866 
1994 1661 3151 1.8970 1 57 2.6850 
1995 1889 3513 1.8597 1 50 2.2218 
1996 1871 3356 1.7937 1 32 1.9628 
1997 1817 3274 1.8019 1 30 2.0187 
1998 1749 3169 1.8119 1 29 2.0809 
1999 1348 2534 1.8798 1 24 2.2116 
2000 1562 2930 1.8758 1 26 2.2039 
2001 1481 2725 1.8400 1 29 2.1097 
2002 1436 2595 1.8071 1 29 2.0872 
2003 1422 2490 1.7511 1 28 1.9577 
2004 1362 2293 1.6836 1 32 1.8557 
2005   531   891 1.6780 1 31 2.1368 
Overall 23608 43749 1.8531 1 59 2.2972 
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Table 2. Pension Variable Definitions.  
Panel A. Variables from Compustat. 
Variable  Description 
TA Total Assets 
MktCap Market Capitalization 
NOA Net Operating Assets /lag(TA) 
TotAccru Total Accruals /lag(TA) 
NI Net Income/lag(TA) 
OCF Operating Cash Flow/lag(TA) 
R&D Research and Development/lag(TA) 
CapExp Capital Expenditure/lag(TA) 
Acquisn Acquisition/lag(TA) 
Dividend Dividend/lag(TA) 
LTD Long Term Debt/lag(TA) 
LTDissue Long Term Debt Issue/lag(TA) 
FV Fund Market Value of Pension Asset 
PBO Projected Benefit Obligation 
FvToTa Fund Market Value of Pension Asset to Total Asset 
PboToTa Projected Benefit Obligation to Total Asset 
FvToPbo Fund Market Value of Pension Asset to PBO 
FR Funding Ratio = ( FV-PBO) / lag(MktCap) 
Fstatus Fund Status = (FV- PBO) /lag(TA) 
OBSliab Off Balance Sheet Liabilities/lag(TA) 
CompRate Compensation Rate/lag(TA) 
DiscRate Discount Rate/lag(TA) 
IntCost Interest Cost/lag(TA) 
PenCost Pension Cost/lag(TA) 
ServCost Service Cost/lag(TA) 
OthPCost Other Pension Cost Items/lag(TA) 
PriorSC Prior Service Cost/lag(TA) 
ERR Expected Rate Return 
RET Stock market return 
ROA Return on Asset  
ROE  Return on Equity 
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Table 2. (Continued) 
 
Panel B. Variables from Schedule B of Form 5500.  
Variable  Description 
CurAst Fund Current Assets   
CurLia Fund Current Liability  
MC Mandatory Contribution (Amount)   
DRC Deficit Reduction Contribution (Amount) 
MRC Minimum Required Contribution (Amount) To Avoid Fund Deficiency 
OldLia Unfunded Old Liability (Amount)  
NewLia Unfunded New Liability (Amount)  
GWAY Gateway, Ratio of Fund Current Assets to Current Liability  
McToCurAst Mandatory Contribution to Fund Current Assets 
MrcToCurAst Minimum Required Contribution to Fund Current Assets 
DrcToCurAst Deficit Reduction Contribution to Fund Current Assets 
OldLiaToCurAst Unfunded Old Liability to Fund Current Assets 
NewLiaToCurAst Unfunded New Liability to Fund Current Assets 
McToCurLia Mandatory Contribution to Fund Current Liability  
 
  
Panel C.  Variables from Compustat and Schedule B of Form 5500.  
Variable  Description 
McToTa Mandatory Contribution in Schedule B to TA in Compustat 
DrcToTa Deficit Reduction Contribution in Schedule B to TA in Compustat 
MrcToTa Minimum Fund Contribution in Schedule B to TA in Compustat 
OldLiaToTa Unfunded Old Liability in Schedule B to TA in Compustat 
NewLiaToTa Unfunded New Liability in Schedule B to TA in Compustat 
CurAstToTa Fund Current Assets in Schedule B to TA in Compustat 
CurLiaToTa Fund Current Liability in Schedule B to TA in Compustat 
McToFV Mandatory Contribution in Schedule B to Fund Value in Compustat 
McToPbo Mandatory Contribution in Schedule B to PBO in Compustat  
CurAstToFV Fund Current Assets in Schedule B to Fund Value in Compustat 
CurLiaToPbo Fund Current Liability in Schedule B to PBO in Compustat  
FVToPbo Fund Market Value to Projected Benefit Obligation in Compustat 
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3.3 Methodology 
 
3.3.1 Grouping Strategy 
Most portfolio analyses use firm-year strategy by grouping firms yearly based on 
some criteria. The same firm-year grouping strategy is used by Rauh (2006) when 
examining the capital expenditures of MC firms and Franzoni (2008) when investigating 
the market assessments of financial constraints due to MC. The drawback of the firm-year 
grouping is that it pools together all MC firms in a given year without differentiating 
between firms making MC just once, or sporadically, from those with recurring MC 
commitments. Firms that are subject to the MC requirement just once may have the 
financial strength to recover from the pension liability shortfall, while firms with longer 
term MC requirements may not. Analyzing these firms together will confound the 
estimated results and perhaps underestimate the MC effect.  
My analyses follow a two-pronged strategy. First, I focus on a subset of MC firms 
with a single, uninterrupted string of MC payments with lengths varying from one to six 
or more consecutive years and analyze whether the implications of the MC string length 
are impounded in stock market returns, in the forecasts and revisions of analysts, and in 
the holdings of different classes of institutional investors. Second, I examine the 
characteristics of MC firms with multiple years and periods of MC, using factor analysis 
and then cluster analysis to group MC firms into clusters. I then repeat my analyses on the 
identified clusters along with two additional groups of firms: those with no mandatory 
contributions during the sample period (NMC) and those with just one year of MC 
payments (ONCE).  
 
3.3.2 Market Reactions 
To examine market responses, I use market, three-factor (Fama and French, 1993) 
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and four-factor (Jegadesh and Titman, 1993) time-series regressions to obtain alphas and 
factor loadings for each group.  
Ri,t= αi + bi EXMt + ei,t      (1) 
Ri,t= αi + bi EXMt + hi HMLt+ si SMBt + ei,t      (2) 
Ri,t= αi + bi EXMt + hi HMLt + si SMBt + miUMDt + ei,t      (3) 
In the above models, subscript i represents each MC firm group and t represents 
time. R is the firm’s return in a group; EXM, HML, SMB and UMB represent market, 
book-to-market, size and momentum factors
2
.  Then, I calculate the risk adjusted returns 
using the estimated coefficients from the above models.   
 
3.3.3 Analyst Forecasts and Revisions  
Starting with the first quarter after the first MC fiscal year for a given firm, I use 
the I/B/E/S detail file to calculate mean/median analyst earnings forecasts and forecast 
errors, number of revisions, mean/median revision values and analyst following in the 
following quarters. Forecasted mean and median values are calculated from the most 
recent estimates for all analysts in the forecasted quarter. Analyst following is defined as 
the number of analysts who make at least one estimated forecast in the quarter.  
I use forecast error and absolute value of forecast error to examine analysts’ 
forecast accuracy. Forecasted error (mean or median) is defined as:   
FEi,q= (FEPSi,q – AEPSi,q) / Pi,q-1    (4) 
Where, subscript i and q represent firm i and quarter q. FE is the analyst’s forecast 
error and FEPS is the analyst’ earnings forecasts per share calculated from I/B/E/S detailed 
file, AEPS is the actual earnings per share announced by the firm, and Pq-1 is the stock price at 
previous quarter.  
                                              
2
 I thank Ken R. French for these Factors which are downloaded from his data library website: 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html. 
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 Absolute value of forecast accuracy is defined as:   
AbsFEi,q= |(FEPSi,q – AEPSi,q)| / Pi,q-1     (5) 
Where, for firm i, AbsFEi,q is the absolute value of forecast error at quarter q, FEPS i,q and 
AEPSi,q are the same as defined above.  
Number of revisions is the total number of revisions made by all analysts in one 
quarter. Mean revisions are calculated as: 
REVi,q = ∑a∑t(FEPSi,q,a,t - FEPSi,q,a,t-1) / NREVi,q    (6) 
Where REVi,q is the mean revision for firm i in quarter q, FEPSi,q,a,t is analyst a’s forecast 
for firm i in quarter q at time t, FEPSi,q,a,t-1 is analyst a’s forecast for firm i in quarter q at 
time t-1 ant NREVi,q  is the total number of revisions of all analysts for firm i and quarter 
q.  
 
3.3.4. Institutional Holdings 
Using the institutional investor information from 13(f) filings and shares 
outstanding from CRSP, I define PIH and CPIH as: 
PIH i,q =  ISHARES i,q / TSHARES i,q  (7) 
CPIHi,q =  ICSHARES i,q / TSHARES i,q (8)    
Where PIH i,q is the percentage of institutional holdings for firm i in quarter q, 
ISHARESi,q is the total shares held by institutional investors for firm i in quarter q, 
TSHARES i,q is the total shares outstanding for firm i in quarter q, CPIH  i,q is the changes 
of percentage of institutional holdings firm i in quarter q, and ICSHARES i,q is the change 
of shares for firm i from previous quarter to the current quarter.    
To investigate the influence of institutional investor class and style, I classify 
institutional investors into three classes and four styles based on the classification used in 
Bushee
3
(2001) and Abarbanee, Bushee and Raedy (2003).   
                                              
3
 I am grateful to Brian Bushee for providing the institution classification codes.  
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The three classes of institutional investors are defined as DED, QIX and TRA.    
DED = Dedicated investors, who have low turnover and more concentrated 
portfolio holdings.  
QIX = Quasi-indexer investors, who have low turnover and diversified portfolio 
holdings.  
TRA = Transient investors, who have high portfolio turnover and diversified 
portfolio holdings.  
The four styles of institutional investors are defined as LVA, LGR, SVA and SGR.   
LVA = Large-Value investors, who prefer large firms, which are high on the value 
and fiduciary dimensions and low on historical growth-risk dimension. 
LGR = Large-Growth investors, who hold large firms with greater future growth 
potential than firms held by large-value investors.  
SVA = Small-Value investors, who prefer small-cap firms (though not as small as 
small-growth funds) that are high on the value dimension and low on the prior growth risk 
dimension.  
SGR = Small-Growth investors, who prefer small-cap firms that are high on the 
growth dimension.  
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CHAPTER 4 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
Panel A of Table 3 reports the firm-year distributions of large DB plans by 
industry. For all firm-years, the top three industries that sponsor most large DB plans are 
Financial Services (13.94%), Transportation (9.86%) and Utilities (9.37%), while the 
bottom three are Software (0.93%), Real Estate (1.04%) and Miscellaneous 
Manufacturing (1.22%). However, for MC firm-years, Transportation (14.67%), Metal 
(11.08%) and Machinery (10.34) are the three most prevalent industries. In terms of firm 
distributions, Panel B of Table 3 shows the same top and bottom three industries as shown 
in Panel A. The results reveal a great deal of variation among industries in sponsoring 
large DB plans and being subject to the MC requirement. The Financial Services industry 
sponsors the most DB plans, while the Transportation industry is the most heavily 
represented among MC firms. Further investigation finds that, within the Transportation 
industry, airlines represent the largest MC sub-industry. As reported by GAO (2004), 
airlines have faced considerable debt and pension fund obligation because their financial 
performance has deteriorated significantly since 2000.  
Table 4 shows the distributions of all firms from Schedule B of Form 5500, sorted 
by number of MC years and periods, with period defined as an interval of consecutive MC 
years. The data in Table 4 indicate that 1,449 firms (54% of the sample) are not subject to 
the MC requirement during the entire sample period, and there are 369 firms that were 
subject to the additional funding requirement for one year only. Of the 200 firms with two 
MC years, 138 firms have one continuous two-year period when they were subject to the 
MC requirement, while 62 firms have two separate MC periods of one year each.  The 
maximum number of MC periods is 7 and the maximum number of MC years is 15.  Of 
the 1218 MC firms, 369 firms (31%) have only one MC year and 734 firms (60%) have 
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Table 3. Industry Breakdown for Mandatory Contribution (MC) and Non-Mandatory Contribution 
(NMC) Firms.  
Panel A. Firm-Year Distribution of MC and NMC Across Industries.   
  First Two or Four   MC Firm-Years NMC Firm-Years        All Firm-Years  
Industry Digits of SIC  n pct n pct n pct 
Mining, Oil and Gas, Construction 10,12,13,14 87 1.96 496 2.59 583 2.47 
Food, Tobacco 20,21 208 4.70 841 4.39 1049 4.44 
Textile, Apparel 22,23 149 3.36 383 2.00 532 2.25 
Lumber, Furniture, Paper, Printing 24-27 353 7.97 1171 6.11 1524 6.46 
Chemicals and Allied Products 28 284 6.41 1241 6.47 1525 6.46 
Rubber, Plastics, Leather, Glass 30-32 288 6.50 753 3.93 1041 4.41 
Metal Industries 33-34 491 11.08 979 5.10 1470 6.23 
Machinery 35 458 10.34 1088 5.67 1546 6.55 
Electrical Equipment 36 246 5.55 773 4.03 1019 4.32 
Miscellaneous Manufacturing 39 64 1.44 223 1.16 287 1.22 
Transportation 37,38,40-47 650 14.67 1678 8.75 2328 9.86 
Communications 48 50 1.13 588 3.07 638 2.70 
Utilit ies 49 92 2.08 2120 11.05 2212 9.37 
Durable goods wholesale  50,51 156 3.52 745 3.88 901 3.82 
Retail trade 52-59 205 4.63 883 4.60 1088 4.61 
Financial services 60-64 137 3.09 3155 16.45 3292 13.94 
Software  7370-7375 41 0.93 179 0.93 220 0.93 
Real Estate 65-67 52 1.17 194 1.01 246 1.04 
Others Otherwise 419 9.46 1688 8.80 2107 8.92 
Overall   4430 100.00 19178 100 23608 100.00 
 
Panel B. Distribution of MC and NMC Firms Across Industries.   
  First Two or Four           MC Firms        NMC Firms          All Firms 
Industry Digits of SIC  n pct n pct n pct 
Mining, Oil and Gas, Construction 10,12,13,14 31 2.55 38 2.62 69 2.59 
Food, Tobacco 20,21 56 4.61 46 3.17 102 3.82 
Textile, Apparel 22,23 34 2.80 28 1.93 62 2.32 
Lumber, Furniture, Paper, Printing 24-27 84 6.91 67 4.62 151 5.66 
Chemicals and Allied Products 28 85 6.99 73 5.03 158 5.92 
Rubber, Plastics, Leather, Glass 30-32 71 5.84 36 2.48 107 4.01 
Metal Industries 33-34 108 8.80 48 3.31 155 5.81 
Machinery 35 106 8.72 56 3.86 162 6.07 
Electrical Equipment 36 67 5.51 46 3.17 113 4.24 
Miscellaneous Manufacturing 39 20 1.64 15 1.03 35 1.31 
Transportation 37,38,40-47 139 11.43 101 7.03 241 9.04 
Communications 48 20 1.64 59 4.07 79 2.96 
Utilities 49 47 3.87 184 12.68 231 8.66 
Durable goods wholesale 50,51 45 3.70 46 3.17 91 3.41 
Retail trade 52-59 63 5.18 58 4.00 121 4.54 
Financial services 60-64 74 6.09 358 24.67 432 16.20 
Software 7370-7375 13 1.07 13 0.90 26 0.97 
Real Estate 65-67 12 0.99 14 0.96 26 0.97 
Others Otherwise 143 11.68 163 11.30 306 11.47 
Overall   1216 100.00 1449 100 2667 100.00 
 
 
 19 
 
Table 4. Distribution of Firms’ Mandatory Contribution (MC) by Number of Years and Number of Periods .  
 
             Number of Years of MC                  % 
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
Sub 
Total   
 
Number 0 1449 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1449 0.543 
of MC 1 0 369 138 82 69 40 22 18 14 9 7 2 5 5 2 3 785 0.294 
Periods 2 0 0 62 71 41 27 29 15 14 11 9 9 5 2 4 0 299 0.112 
 3 0 0 0 12 22 11 14 16 8 3 10 5 3 0 0 0 104 0.039 
  4 0 0 0 0 5 4 9 3 0 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 25 0.009 
  5 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0.001 
  6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.000 
  7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.000 
  
Sub 
Total 1449 369 200 165 137 83 74 53 38 26 26 18 13 7 6 3 2667   
  % 0.543 0.138 0.075 0.062 0.051 0.031 0.028 0.020 0.014 0.010 0.010 0.007 0.005 0.003 0.002 0.001    1.000 
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one to three MC years. There are three firms that are subject to the MC requirement every 
year. Table 4 shows a large variation of MC years and MC periods among the MC firms 
and provides further evidence of the importance of taking this variation into consideration 
in portfolio analyses.   
The results of Table 5 show the frequency, fund market value of pension assets 
(FV), projected benefit obligation (PBO), total assets (TA) and ratios of FV to PBO 
(FvToPbo), FV to TA (FvToTa) and PBO to TA (PboToTa) for firms with different 
number of plans filed from 1991 to 2005. Panel A shows statistics for all firms. The 
number of plans sponsored by a firm ranges from 1 to 57 and the majority of firms (90%) 
sponsor one to three plans. One-plan firms account for 65% of total firms during this 
period. But the proportion of FV of one-plan firms is 47%, indicating the fund value of 
one-plan firms is relatively small. The mean FV ($343 million) of one-plan firms is 
indeed small in comparison to the overall mean FV ($472 million). The PBO of these 
one-plan firms is also small, making their FvToPbo close to 97%. But the mean asset 
value of these firms is close to the overall mean, indicating these firms are not necessarily 
small firms. As the number of plans increases, the FvToTa shows a generally increasing 
trend until the number of plans reaches 23. The largest FvToTa is 67% for a firm 
sponsoring 23 plans and the same firm also possesses the largest PboToTa (66%).  The 
overall average of FvToPbo presented in the last row is 97.9%, indicating that on average 
plan fund value is only 2.1% below the pension obligation.  The last row also shows that 
FV and PBO account for 15% of total assets but the two proportions vary greatly for 
firms with different number of plans.   
Panel B shows statistics for NMC firms. In comparison with the data in Panel A, 
the maximum number of plans sponsored by NMC firms is 20. In addition, the proportion 
of one-plan firms is 5% higher and the proportion of firms with one to three plans is 3% 
higher than the corresponding statistics for all firms shown in Panel A.  Overall, the data 
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Table 5. Descriptive Statistics for Selected Pension Variables.  
 
Means are in millions of dollars.  
 
Panel A.  All Firms that File Schedule B of 5500 and Have FV, PBO and TA Data in Compustat. 
Number 
          
Frequency             FV 
                 
PBO             TA   RATIO   
of Plans n pct mean pct mean pct mean pct FvToPbo FvToTa PboToTa 
1 9748 0.6495 343 0.4747 344 0.4720 5086 0.6608 0.9682 0.1299 0.1308 
2 2838 0.1891 514 0.2041 559 0.2207 4668 0.1636 0.9940 0.1890 0.1862 
3 985 0.0656 725 0.1002 734 0.1005 4810 0.0578 0.9894 0.1953 0.1942 
4 432 0.0288 708 0.0433 736 0.0446 4090 0.0216 0.9843 0.2148 0.2052 
5 264 0.0176 1002 0.0373 931 0.0338 6676 0.0214 1.0078 0.2122 0.2076 
6 173 0.0115 1324 0.0323 1237 0.0295 7620 0.0164 1.0085 0.2539 0.2475 
7 142 0.0095 1308 0.0259 1025 0.0194 9518 0.0162 0.9815 0.2266 0.2196 
8 88 0.0059 1321 0.0160 1393 0.0167 9518 0.0102 0.9668 0.2560 0.2490 
9 78 0.0052 1982 0.0200 1695 0.0163 10909 0.0105 0.9993 0.2774 0.2775 
10 58 0.0039 1413 0.0113 1536 0.0124 6139 0.0043 1.0587 0.2655 0.2501 
11 40 0.0027 875 0.0049 833 0.0046 4063 0.0020 1.0535 0.2854 0.2708 
12 33 0.0022 1131 0.0052 973 0.0044 5296 0.0021 1.1569 0.2570 0.2161 
13 16 0.0011 1572 0.0034 1357 0.0029 6913 0.0013 1.1324 0.2030 0.1821 
14 16 0.0011 582 0.0013 549 0.0012 3191 0.0006 1.0200 0.1586 0.1580 
15 15 0.0010 484 0.0010 1159 0.0025 3689 0.0007 1.2852 0.2426 0.1973 
16 10 0.0007 1583 0.0023 1711 0.0024 4009 0.0005 1.0084 0.3222 0.3451 
17 11 0.0007 1268 0.0020 1047 0.0016 4854 0.0006 1.1763 0.2999 0.2523 
18 7 0.0005 1246 0.0012 1100 0.0011 3104 0.0003 1.1272 0.3753 0.3284 
19 7 0.0005 2526 0.0022 2736 0.0023 9447 0.0008 0.9798 0.4877 0.5419 
20 9 0.0006 989 0.0013 1005 0.0013 4257 0.0005 0.9968 0.2265 0.2271 
21 3 0.0002 1188 0.0005 1094 0.0005 3867 0.0001 1.1886 0.2901 0.2514 
22 9 0.0006 2146 0.0015 1937 0.0014 16603 0.0018 1.0739 0.4882 0.4543 
23 1 0.0001 3389 0.0005 3334 0.0005 5049 0.0001 1.0163 0.6712 0.6604 
24 4 0.0003 3319 0.0014 2695 0.0011 18177 0.0009 1.2286 0.3797 0.3080 
25 2 0.0001 3307 0.0009 2382 0.0007 9745 0.0002 1.3075 0.3684 0.2893 
26 1 0.0001 2931 0.0004 2425 0.0003 11123 0.0001 1.2087 0.2635 0.2180 
27 1 0.0001 3035 0.0004 3536 0.0005 54019 0.0007 0.8583 0.0562 0.0655 
28 2 0.0001 2379 0.0007 2518 0.0007 12645 0.0003 0.9698 0.1948 0.2177 
29 4 0.0003 2518 0.0007 2513 0.0007 19765 0.0010 1.1162 0.4564 0.3932 
31 3 0.0002 3141 0.0013 3759 0.0016 46114 0.0017 0.8405 0.1359 0.1567 
32 2 0.0001 2367 0.0003 2914 0.0004 13633 0.0003 0.9553 0.5154 0.5087 
36 1 0.0001 357 0.0001 327 0.0000 1890 0.0000 1.0927 0.1888 0.1728 
39 1 0.0001 448 0.0001 424 0.0001 1964 0.0000 1.0560 0.2282 0.2161 
40 1 0.0001 398 0.0001 391 0.0001 1921 0.0000 1.0189 0.2073 0.2034 
50 1 0.0001 3639 0.0005 3024 0.0004 23172 0.0003 1.2034 0.1570 0.1305 
57 2 0.0001 3197 0.0009 2703 0.0008 19013 0.0005 1.1832 0.1681 0.1421 
Total 15008 1.0000 472 1.0000 476 1.0000 5142 1.0000 0.9785 0.1557 0.1548 
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Table 5. (Continued) 
 
Panel B.  NMC Firms that File Schedule B of Form 5500 and Have FV, PBO and TA Data in Compustat.  
Number 
          
Frequency            FV           PBO          TA   RATIO   
of Plans n pct mean pct mean pct mean pct FvToPbo FvToTa PboToTa 
1 8862 0.7190 360 0.5551 356 0.5535 5407 0.7147 0.9898 0.1277 0.1261 
2 2202 0.1786 593 0.2236 631 0.2407 5367 0.1634 1.0361 0.1850 0.1782 
3 619 0.0502 915 0.0969 886 0.0944 6225 0.0527 1.0460 0.1979 0.1885 
4 226 0.0183 790 0.0309 753 0.0297 4997 0.0154 1.0594 0.2335 0.2115 
5 146 0.0118 1117 0.0280 1135 0.0286 7732 0.0153 1.0632 0.2174 0.1974 
6 74 0.0060 1530 0.0200 1114 0.0142 8092 0.0086 1.1189 0.2644 0.2323 
7 48 0.0039 1977 0.0158 1387 0.0102 16756 0.0106 0.9571 0.1768 0.1771 
8 39 0.0032 1735 0.0112 1813 0.0118 14768 0.0079 1.0740 0.2588 0.2439 
9 33 0.0027 1383 0.0063 1278 0.0058 14155 0.0065 1.0641 0.3259 0.3109 
10 20 0.0016 1657 0.0058 1455 0.0051 7330 0.0020 1.1969 0.2454 0.2132 
11 11 0.0009 486 0.0009 430 0.0008 1434 0.0002 1.1242 0.3863 0.3520 
12 14 0.0011 751 0.0018 662 0.0016 4450 0.0008 1.1899 0.1895 0.1513 
13 8 0.0006 386 0.0005 329 0.0005 4256 0.0005 1.2192 0.1184 0.0966 
14 5 0.0004 436 0.0004 377 0.0003 3747 0.0003 1.1600 0.1225 0.1085 
15 8 0.0006 186 0.0003 160 0.0002 1099 0.0001 1.4147 0.2193 0.1546 
16 4 0.0003 1186 0.0008 1385 0.0010 3779 0.0002 0.9692 0.2891 0.3190 
17 1 0.0001 3699 0.0006 2869 0.0005 18293 0.0002 1.2893 0.2022 0.1568 
18 2 0.0002 395 0.0001 376 0.0001 1866 0.0001 1.1279 0.2125 0.1909 
19 2 0.0002 3234 0.0006 3617 0.0006 15342 0.0004 0.8762 0.7581 0.8665 
20 2 0.0002 877 0.0003 939 0.0003 4236 0.0001 0.9287 0.2170 0.2259 
  12326 1.0000 469 1.0000 465 1.0000 5559 1.0000 1.0053 0.1471 0.1432 
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Table 5. (Continued) 
 
Panel C.  MC Firms that File Schedule B of Form 5500 and Have FV, PBO and TA Data in Compustat.   
Number 
                      
Frequency            FV           PBO           TA   RATIO   
of Plans n pct mean pct mean pct mean pct FvToPbo FvToTa PboToTa 
1 850 0.3259 195 0.1350 239 0.1577 2221 0.2453 0.7665 0.1203 0.1556 
2 619 0.2373 278 0.1381 306 0.1448 2117 0.1578 0.8507 0.1734 0.1999 
3 360 0.1380 438 0.1268 420 0.1151 2482 0.1058 0.8934 0.1855 0.1947 
4 201 0.0771 619 0.1009 718 0.1118 3096 0.0751 0.9016 0.1837 0.1982 
5 114 0.0437 781 0.0724 672 0.0580 4697 0.0644 0.9295 0.2057 0.2203 
6 98 0.0376 973 0.0731 1009 0.0716 5728 0.0645 0.9297 0.2360 0.2592 
7 93 0.0357 864 0.0635 878 0.0617 5018 0.0542 0.9874 0.2520 0.2413 
8 48 0.0184 1002 0.0384 1069 0.0392 5232 0.0298 0.8797 0.2311 0.2533 
9 45 0.0173 1957 0.0673 1729 0.0541 8509 0.0455 0.9518 0.2418 0.2530 
10 37 0.0142 1277 0.0368 1332 0.0366 5511 0.0243 0.9840 0.2760 0.2695 
11 29 0.0111 1028 0.0230 991 0.0212 5060 0.0170 1.0267 0.2471 0.2400 
12 17 0.0065 819 0.0111 1214 0.0167 5919 0.0131 1.0894 0.3068 0.2639 
13 8 0.0031 1385 0.0066 2531 0.0135 9571 0.0089 1.0456 0.2875 0.2675 
14 11 0.0042 648 0.0057 627 0.0053 2938 0.0038 0.9563 0.1751 0.1804 
15 7 0.0027 881 0.0042 884 0.0040 6648 0.0054 1.1372 0.2692 0.2461 
16 6 0.0023 1847 0.0089 1928 0.0088 4162 0.0029 1.0346 0.3443 0.3625 
17 10 0.0038 1025 0.0082 865 0.0066 3510 0.0041 1.1650 0.3097 0.2618 
18 5 0.0019 1586 0.0063 1389 0.0053 3599 0.0021 1.1270 0.4404 0.3833 
19 5 0.0019 2384 0.0095 2560 0.0098 7089 0.0041 1.0213 0.3796 0.4120 
20 7 0.0027 1020 0.0057 1024 0.0055 4263 0.0035 1.0163 0.2292 0.2275 
21 3 0.0012 1188 0.0028 1094 0.0025 3867 0.0013 1.1886 0.2901 0.2514 
22 9 0.0035 2146 0.0086 1937 0.0074 16603 0.0174 1.0739 0.4882 0.4543 
23 1 0.0004 3389 0.0027 3334 0.0025 5049 0.0006 1.0163 0.6712 0.6604 
24 4 0.0015 3319 0.0080 2695 0.0062 18177 0.0084 1.2286 0.3797 0.3080 
25 2 0.0008 3307 0.0053 2382 0.0036 9745 0.0023 1.3075 0.3684 0.2893 
26 1 0.0004 2931 0.0023 2425 0.0019 11123 0.0013 1.2087 0.2635 0.2180 
27 1 0.0004 3035 0.0024 3536 0.0027 54019 0.0063 0.8583 0.0562 0.0655 
28 2 0.0008 2379 0.0038 2518 0.0038 12645 0.0029 0.9698 0.1948 0.2177 
29 4 0.0015 2518 0.0040 2513 0.0038 19765 0.0092 1.1162 0.4564 0.3932 
31 3 0.0012 3141 0.0075 3759 0.0086 33892 0.0079 0.8405 0.1359 0.1567 
32 2 0.0008 2367 0.0019 2914 0.0022 13633 0.0032 0.9553 0.5154 0.5087 
36 1 0.0004 357 0.0003 327 0.0002 1890 0.0002 1.0927 0.1888 0.1728 
39 1 0.0004 448 0.0004 424 0.0003 1964 0.0002 1.0560 0.2282 0.2161 
40 1 0.0004 398 0.0003 391 0.0003 1921 0.0002 1.0189 0.2073 0.2034 
50 1 0.0004 3639 0.0029 3024 0.0023 23172 0.0027 1.2034 0.1570 0.1305 
57 2 0.0008 3197 0.0051 2703 0.0041 19013 0.0044 1.1832 0.1681 0.1421 
  2608 1.0000 479 1.0000 503 1.0000 3127 1.0000 0.8603 0.1756 0.1963 
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show that MC firms tend to sponsor more pension plans. The FV and PBO are slightly 
lower and TA is 8% higher for NMC firms. On average, NMC firms are 0.5% overfunded 
with a fund surplus of $4 million.   
Panel C shows corresponding statistics for MC firms. As suggested by the data in 
Panels A and B, more MC firms sponsor multiple plans.  Firms that sponsor 21 plans or 
more are all MC firms. The proportion of firms sponsoring two or more plans increases to 
67% for MC firms from 38% for NMC firms. The means of FV and PBO are slightly 
higher than those for NMC firms but the mean of TA is smaller, although a large 
variation is observed for firms with more than 21 plans. The size of MC firms is smaller 
in terms of total assets.  The mean of FvToPbo shows that on average these firms are 
14% underfunded with a deficit of $24 million on average.  The average PboToTa is 2% 
higher than the average FvToTa, indicating that on average these firms need to contribute 
additional cash equal to 2% of their assets to meet their pension benefit obligation.  
Table 6 presents descriptive statistics for NMC, MC, combined NMC and MC 
firms, and all firms in Compustat with pension data in the same period. The results show 
that NMC firms are in general healthier and more profitable than MC firms. NMC firms 
are larger, have more net income and operational cash flow, and pay higher dividend than 
MC firms. Recent studies by Zhang (2006) and Papanastasopoulos et al. (2007) show a 
negative relation between net operating assets (NOA) and future stock returns.  The data 
in Table 6 show that NMC firms have lower NOA values than MC firms.  
NMC firms spend more on R&D and capital expenditure but less on acquisitions. 
The combined NMC and MC firm sample spends 5.8% of the preceding year’s total 
assets on capital expenditures, lower than the 6.8% ratio reported by Rauh (2006) who 
combines 5500 data with Compustat in the period 1990-1998.  NMC firms have 4.6% 
less long term debt (LTD) and 1.8% less long term debt issuance (LTDissue) than MC 
firms.  
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Table 6. Descriptive Statistics Calculated from Compustat Data for Mandatory Contribution (MC) and Non-Mandatory Contribution (NMC) Firms, 
All NMC and MC Firms and All Compustat Firms.  
 
All variables are winsorized to exclude extreme values outside of three standard deviations. TA, MktCap, FV and PBO are in millions of dollars and all other 
variables are expressed in ratios. See Table 2 for variable definitions.      
                    NMC Firms                  MC Firms All NMC and MC Firms All Compustat Firms 
Variable  Mean  Median Std Mean  Median Std Mean  Median Std mean median std 
TA 5559.1 1151.1 12853.5 3127.61 657.4 8777.4 5142.7 1050.6 12274.0 5319.2 789.4 15728.4 
MktCap 3087.7 660.5 6805.5 2360.2 408.2 5732.2 2964.1 607.2 6640.8 2988.1 483.8 7827.4 
NOA 0.5981 0.6512 0.2737 0.6253 0.6472 0.2615 0.6027 0.6505 0.2719 0.6092 0.6435 0.6607 
TotAccru -0.0513 -0.0486 0.0731 -0.0562 -0.0509 0.0862 -0.0522 -0.0490 0.0757 -0.0578 -0.0486 0.1513 
NI 0.0399 0.0353 0.0726 0.0195 0.0303 0.0988 0.0364 0.0346 0.0781 0.0149 0.0305 0.2370 
OCF 0.0939 0.0902 0.0704 0.0779 0.0774 0.0729 0.0909 0.0877 0.0712 0.0749 0.0797 0.1507 
R&D 0.0302 0.0189 0.0336 0.0261 0.0171 0.0293 0.0293 0.0186 0.0327 0.0333 0.0165 0.0480 
CapExp 0.0586 0.0496 0.0432 0.0535 0.0449 0.0385 0.0576 0.0487 0.0424 0.0585 0.0448 0.0585 
Acquisn 0.0185 0.0000 0.0513 0.0210 0.0000 0.0541 0.0190 0.0000 0.0518 0.0216 0.0000 0.0792 
Dividend 0.5420 0.3726 0.6202 0.3741 0.1100 0.5364 0.5131 0.3200 0.6099 0.4338 0.1500 0.6073 
LTD 0.2270 0.2092 0.1851 0.2734 0.2463 0.2052 0.2348 0.2148 0.1894 0.2458 0.2059 0.2453 
LTDissue 0.0892 0.0300 0.1529 0.1075 0.0359 0.1787 0.0925 0.0310 0.1581 0.1079 0.0255 0.2357 
FV 468.59 87.10 1175.72 479.25 61.72 1288.31 471.95 82.62 1196.38 448.44 46.54 1251.82 
PBO 465.19 87.26 1174.28 503.27 73.37 1379.28 475.85 84.70 1213.10 479.19 47.61 1397.24 
FvToTa 0.1471 0.1039 0.1852 0.1756 0.1218 0.1968 0.1557 0.1064 0.1874 0.1184 0.0659 0.1598 
PboToTa 0.1432 0.1050 0.1692 0.1963 0.1441 0.2008 0.1548 0.1104 0.1760 0.1216 0.0713 0.1604 
FvToPbo 1.0053 0.9813 0.2556 0.8603 0.8570 0.2301 0.9785 0.9590 0.2569 0.9381 0.9256 0.2858 
FR 0.0039 -0.0009 0.0996 -0.0294 -0.1486 0.1399 -0.0052 -0.0023 0.1131 -0.0012 -0.0018 0.1234 
Fstatus 0.0032 -0.0005 0.0454 -0.0177 -0.0116 0.0508 -0.0004 -0.0016 0.0470 -0.0054 -0.0010 0.0470 
OBSliab -0.0033 0.0000 0.0285 0.0076 0.0058 0.0302 -0.0011 0.0007 0.0291 -0.0002 0.0000 0.0209 
CompRate 0.0478 0.0500 0.7724 0.0479 0.0500 0.8252 0.0479 0.0500 0.7805 0.0398 0.0450 0.0019 
DiscRate 0.0736 0.0750 0.7315 0.0750 0.0750 0.7656 0.0739 0.0750 0.7389 0.0628 0.0700 0.0025  
IntCost 0.0105 0.0072 0.0117 0.0140 0.0101 0.0145 0.0111 0.0076 0.0123 0.0081 0.0071 0.0106 
PenCost 0.0025 0.0018 0.0055 0.0049 0.0038 0.0059 0.0029 0.0021 0.0056 0.0028 0.0014 0.0061 
ServCost  0.0045 0.0036 0.0038 0.0050 0.0044 0.0038 0.0046 0.0037 0.0038 0.0036 0.0020 0.0039 
OthPCost 0.0032 0.0004 0.0131 0.0035 0.0009 0.0138 0.0032 0.0005 0.0132 0.0020 0.0009 0.0109 
PriorSC 0.0033 0.0013 0.0057 0.0046 0.0028 0.0069 0.0036 0.0015 0.0060 0.0055 0.0000 0.0046 
ERR 0.0882 0.0900 0.7630 0.0893 0.0900 0.8146 0.0883 0.0900 0.7729 0.0755 0.0850 0.0029 
RET 0.0823 0.0565 0.3846 0.0161 0.0000 0.4136 0.0713 0.0461 0.3903 0.0682 0.0325 0.4449 
ROA 0.0092 0.0085 0.0174 0.0043 0.0073 0.0236 0.0084 0.0083 0.0186 0.0037 0.0073 0.0451 
ROE 0.0277 0.0311 0.1078 0.0161 0.0262 0.1383 0.0257 0.0306 0.1135 0.0178 0.0280 0.3341 
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The FV of NMC firms is higher than their PBO on average, resulting in 
overfunded pension plans on average. In contrast, FV of MC firms is lower than PBO, 
resulting in pension plans being 14% underfunded on average.  The off-balance-sheet 
liability (OBSliab) for NMC firms is much smaller than MC firms. The results also show 
that compensation rate and discount rate of MC firms are higher than those of NMC 
firms. Further, MC firms have higher interest cost, pension cost, service cost, other 
pension cost and prior pension cost than NMC firms. Higher service cost in MC firms is 
expected since it is a function of compensation rate and discount rate (Picconi, 2004). 
Comparing the ERR and raw annual return, I find that the average ERR of NMC firms is 
only slightly higher than the annual return (8.8% vs 8.2%), but the average ERR of MC 
firms is far higher than the annual return (8.9% vs 1.6%). The managers of MC firms 
choose a higher ERR assumption than the NMC firms although the MC firms show less 
annual return.  
MC firms are less profitable as shown by lower annual return (raw), ROA and 
ROE. Columns 8 to 10 show statistics for combined NMC and MC firms that file 
Schedule B of Form 5500, and the last three columns display the results for all Compustat 
firms with pension benefit plans. In general, the differences between the firms filing 
Schedule B and the Compustat firms with pension fund information are less prominent in 
non-pension fund characteristics than in pension fund characteristics. The firms with 
Form 5500 Schedule B filings have slightly lower values for total assets, market cap, 
R&D, capital expenditure, acquisition and LTD and higher NI, OCF and dividend values 
on average than the Compustat firms. Higher FV, FvToPbo, fund ratio (FR), and fund 
status values and lower PBO among the Form 5500 Schedule B firms show that these 
firms are better funded than the Compustat firms on average. These firms also show 
higher annual return (raw), ROA and ROE than Compustat firms with pension plans in 
general.  
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Figure 1 displays the pension fund status defined as FV/PBO -1 (Rauh, 2006) for 
Form 5500 Schedule B data and Compustat data. Lines above zero show the overfunded 
years, while lines below zero show the underfunded years. Although the two groups of 
firms show similar trends, firms with Form 5500 filings demonstrate slightly higher fund 
status. Both data show that in the three-year span from 1999 to 2002, pension fund status 
went from the best (10% overfunded in 1999) to the worst (25% underfunded in 2002). 
Following 2002, fund status starts recovering but slowly.  
Table 7 shows the characteristics of MC firms. I define CurAst as the fund current 
asset value in Schedule B to distinguish it from FV, defined as the fund current asset 
value in Compustat. Since firms only file Form 5500 to report sponsored US pension 
funds, the difference between the two is the firms’ global fund assets value plus the 
difference between the actuarial value and accounting values. Similarly, CurLia is the 
fund current liability in schedule B and PBO is the projected benefit obligation in 
Compustat. The CurAst of these firms is close to $260 million which is about 12% of 
total assets. The mandatory contribution of these firms is 2.65% of fund current assets 
($6.9 million) and 0.19% of total assets. MRC, the minimum contribution required from 
employers at the Form 5500 filing date to prevent an accumulated funding deficiency in 
the plan’s FSA, is close to 6% of CurAst, 2.24 times the corresponding MC ratio.   
The unfunded old liability amount, OldLia, is .85% of fund assets, while the 
unfunded new liability amount, NewLia
4
, accounts for 3.7% of fund assets. One of the  
                                              
4
 I define NewLia as the unfunded new liability amount, which is a specified percentage of any unfunded 
new liability arising during the current period, The percentage is derived from a formula that takes into 
account the plan’s funded status. The lower the funding status, the higher the proportion of the unfunded 
new liability that flows into NewLia.      
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Figure 1. Distribution of Pension Funding Status for Schedule B of Form 5500 Data and All Compustat Data.   
 
The funding status is defined as pension assets (PA) minus pension liabilities, the projected benefit obligation (PBO), 
divided by PBO (Rau, 2006).  
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Table 7. Characteristics of Mandatory Contributions (MC) Firms from Schedule B of 
Form 5500 and Compustat Data.  
 
All variables are winsorized to exclude the extreme values outside of three standard 
deviations. All variables are expressed in ratios except for CurAst that is in millions of dollars. 
See Table 2 for variable definitions. 
  MC Firms 
Variable mean median std 
CurAst 259.52 28.82 893.62 
McToCurAst 0.0265 0.0136 0.0351 
DrcToCurAst 0.0646 0.0370 0.0784 
MrcToCurAst 0.0593 0.0299 0.0944 
OldLiaToCurAst 0.0085 0.0000 0.0180 
NewLiaToCurAst 0.0372 0.0175 0.0507 
McToCurLia 0.0218 0.0119 0.0413 
GWAY 0.8832 0.8614 0.2017 
McToTa 0.0019 0.0006 0.0035 
DrcToTa 0.0046 0.0017 0.0076 
MrcToTa 0.0131 0.0013 0.0308 
OldLiaToTa 0.0007 0.0000 0.0022 
NewLiaToTa   0.0025 0.0007 0.0051 
CurAstToTa 0.1207 0.0777 0.1298 
CurLiaToTa 0.1334 0.0858 0.1513 
McToFv  0.0192 0.0082 0.0289 
McToPbo 0.0145 0.0068 0.0203 
CurAstToFv 0.8441 0.9302 0.3241 
CurLiaToPbo 0.7829 0.8361 0.3184 
FvToPbo 0.8595 0.8547 0.2174 
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reasons that NewLia is 4.31 times as high as OldLia is due to the shorter amortization 
period required for NewLia.  The unfunded old liability amount is derived by 
amortizing the unfunded old liability (defined as the current liability of the first plan 
year after December 31, 1987), using equal installments of principal and interest over 
18 years. The unfunded new liability before amortization (not shown in the table) is 4 
times as large as NewLia, implying that the length of unfunded new liability 
amortization on average is 4 years. The amortization of NewLia is 4.5 times as fast as 
the amortization of the OldLia, closely approximating the ratio of NewLia to OldLia 
mentioned above.  The data also indicate that DRC, the deficit reduction contribution, 
is about 2.3 times as large as MC.  Overall, the data suggest that NewLia and DRC are 
the main drivers of MC.  
GWAY, which is defined as the ratio of CurAst over CurLia and measures the 
funding percentage, shows that these firms’ pension funds are only 88% funded, on 
average. Mandatory contribution of these firms to underfunded pension funds is equal 
to 0.19% of total assets, higher than the 0.1% reported by Rauh (2006) using data from 
1990 to 1998 and defining the mandatory contribution as the maximum of DRC and 
MRC (with MRC estimated as normal cost plus 10% of the ERISA underfunding).  
One of the reasons for the difference could arise because this study utilizes the firms’ 
actual MC for the year as reported in Schedule B of Form 5500, However, it is likely 
that the difference is mainly due to the dramatic drop in funding status after 2000 as 
shown in Figure 1.  
The current value of US pension fund assets to total assets for MC firms is 
12.1% , while the ratio of fund liability to total assets is 13.3%. There is a noteworthy 
difference between Compustat data and Schedule B of Form 5500 data as regards 
pension funding status. For MC firms, the Gateway percentage (Schedule B data) 
shows 2.3% higher pension funding than does FVtoPBO (Compustat data). The ratio 
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of fund current asset value for Form 5500 Schedule B firms is 15.6% lower than the 
corresponding Compustat value. In contrast, the ratio of fund current liability in Form 
5500 Schedule B filings is 21.7% lower than for Compustat data. While the difference 
in the liability values from the two data sets is due to differences in the calculation of 
the pension liability (accumulated benefit obligation (ABO) in Schedule B and 
projected benefit obligation (PBO) in Compustat), and the PBO’s inclusion of 
company’s global pension plans, the significant differences across the two databases 
raises an interesting question.  Is the difference solely due to reporting differences (i.e., 
PBO vs ABO values) or could firms be reporting lower (higher) pension liability 
(assets) in Schedule B to lower pension contributions?  Since PBO incorporates 
employees’ future compensation level, it is usually greater than ABO (Kwan, 2003).  
There have been discussions about which pension liability estimate, ABO or PBO, is a 
better measure of pension fund obligation (Bodie, 1999; Salva and Beik, 2003; Sohn 
2006). Studying the differences and consequences of the two reporting requirements 
should be an interesting research project but it is out of the scope of this study.  
Figure 2 shows MC, DRC and NewLia as proportions of fund current assets by 
years. The overall trends demonstrate a positive association between DRC, MC and 
NewLia. DRC values jumped after 1994 due to the change in the calculation of DRC 
corresponding RPA ’94 which became law on December 8, 19945. Furthermore, more 
conservative assumptions were used for determining liability, resulting in higher 
current liability values. In keeping with the stock market, the three variable values also 
become more volatile after 2000.     
Correlations between MC characteristics and TA, FV and PBO are presented in  
                                              
5
 Starting 1995, in addition to NewLia and OldLia, the DRC includes the expected 
increase in the RPA’94 current liability due to benefits accruing during the plan year 
and the aggregate of the unfunded mortality increase amounts.   
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Figure 2. The Proportions of Mandatory Contribution, Deficit Reduction Contribution and Fund New Liability 
Amount to Fund Current Asset (MCToCur, DrcToCur and MewLToCur).  
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Table 8. The Pearson correlations are shown above the diagonals. MC is highly 
correlated with DRC and NewLia. MRC is highly correlated with NewLia and MC due to 
the contribution of the latter two in determining MRC. CurAst and CurLia are highly 
correlated (.96) and DRC is highly correlated with NewLia(.75). All three variables from 
Compustat, TA, FV and PBO are highly correlated with one another. Since CurAst and 
CurLia account for high proportions of FV and PBO, they are all highly correlated.   
Table 9 reports earnings-to-price (E/P), and book-to-market (BE/ME) ratios, as 
well as monthly returns, and monthly value and equally-weighted weighted returns for 
NMC and MC firms. The E/P ratios show that the NMC firms earn 3.5 cent yearly for 
each dollar of stock price, while MC firms earn negative 0.3 cent yearly for each dollar of 
stock prince. The higher earnings from NMC firms don’t necessarily imply these firms 
are value firms in comparison with MC firms because the BE/ME for NMC firms is only 
1% higher than the corresponding value for MC firms. All three returns show that the 
NMC firms earn higher monthly returns than the MC firms.  
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Table 8. Correlations between MC Firm Characteristics.  
 
Pearson correlations coefficients are above the diagonal and the Spearman correlation coefficients 
are below the diagonal. 
          
Name MC DRC MRC OldLia NewLia CurAst CurLia TA FV PBO 
MC   0.90 0.82 0.22 0.45 0.21 0.24 0.13 0.24 0.27 
DRC 0.87   0.69 0.43 0.75 0.21 0.30 0.14 0.26 0.34 
MRC 0.62 0.61   0.17 0.69 0.13 0.19 0.07 0.09 0.20 
OldLia 0.09 0.23 -0.08   0.43 0.11 0.21 0.13 0.17 0.24 
NewLia 0.76 0.83 0.60 -0.05   0.20 0.31 0.16 0.25 0.34 
CurAst 0.55 0.58 0.30 0.13 0.47   0.96 0.68 0.96 0.91 
CurLia 0.59 0.63 0.36 0.15 0.52 0.99   0.62 0.94 0.93 
TA 0.46 0.45 0.11 -0.03 0.40 0.71 0.71   0.68 0.66 
FV  0.50 0.51 0.20 0.10 0.42 0.92 0.91 0.84   0.98 
PBO 0.54 0.55 0.23 0.10 0.46 0.91 0.91 0.85 0.99   
 
 
Table 9. Earnings to Price (E/P), Book Equity to Market Equity (BE/ME), Monthly 
Returns (Ret) and Value-Weighted (VWRET) and Equally-Weighted (EWRET) Returns 
for NMC and MC Firms. 
  E/P BE/ME Ret VWRET EWRET 
NMC 0.0348 0.6631 0.0131 0.0081 0.0145 
MC  -0.0030 0.6524 0.0090 0.0063 0.0119 
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CHAPTER 5 
FIRMS WITH CONSECUTIVE MANDATORY CONTRIBUTION YEARS 
 
Table 4 shows that 785 of the 1,218 MC firms have only one MC period with 
length ranging from 1 to 15 years. Firms with fewer MC years are likely to be less 
adversely affected by the MC requirement, their quicker recovery also suggesting enough 
financial strength to reduce the gap between pension asset and liability. On the other 
hand, firms with extended MC years are likely to have greater financial difficulty in 
meeting their pension obligations and to be more adversely impacted by the MC 
requirement. To examine how firms are affected by the MC string length, I classify the 
785 firms with one continuous MC period into six groups, MCX, with X ranging from 1 
to 6 to indicate the length of the period (e.g., MC5 indicates five consecutive years, MC6 
indicates six or more consecutive years).  
 
5.1 Excess Returns across MCX Groups  
Panel A of Table 10 presents descriptive statistics for the six MC groups 
described above. Panel A shows statistics using Compustat data. Generally, firms with 
shorter MC period length perform better than those with more consecutive MC years, 
with  firms that make six or more years of MC consecutively (MC6) performing the 
worst. The pension assets of MC1 and MC2 firms meet 96% of PBO: 6-8% higher than 
MC3 and MC4 firms and 9-12% higher than MC5 and MC6 firms.  MC1 and MC2 firms 
report higher OCF, ROA, ROE, CapExp, and lower LTD and PenCost than the other four 
MC firms. The yearly unadjusted returns of MC1 to MC6 are 0.055, 0.064, 0.050, 0.026, 
0.083 and 0.017 respectively.  Although MC5 firms show the highest yearly unadjusted 
return, the ROA of those firms is lower than that of MC1 to MC4 firms, and the ROE of 
MC5 firms is lower than that of MC1 and MC2 firms.  
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Table 10. Descriptive Statistics for Six Mandatory Contribution (MC) Groups.  
 
MC6 consists of firms with six or more consecutive MC years. MC1, MC2, MC3, MC4 and MC5 consist of 
firms with one, two, three, four or five consecutive MC years, respectively. TA, MktCap, FV and PBO are in 
millions of dollars and all other variables are expressed in ratios. See Table 2 for variable definitions. 
 
Panel A. Descriptive Statistics of Six Mandated Contribution (MC) Groups Calculated from Compustat.    
                 MC 1                MC 2                MC 3                MC 4                MC 5                MC 6 
Var mean median mean median mean median mean median mean median mean median 
TA 5923.7 1087.7 3967.8 871.1 4761.0 572.0 3780.2 804.5 3587.6 616.4 3342.7 556.2 
MktCap 3367.1 709.0 3157.2 712.0 1918.7 537.1 4594.9 629.3 2373.8 552.2 2495.0 276.0 
NOA 0.6141 0.6620 0.6051 0.6404 0.7217 0.7256 0.6596 0.6832 0.6518 0.6508 0.6323 0.6463 
TotAccru -0.0533 -0.0489 -0.0552 -0.0520 -0.0585 -0.0540 -0.0372 -0.0427 -0.0555 -0.0509 -0.0504 -0.0450 
NI 0.0401 0.0373 0.0426 0.0412 0.0349 0.0372 0.0403 0.0428 0.0345 0.0383 0.0177 0.0302 
OCF 0.0966 0.0941 0.0989 0.0927 0.0909 0.0931 0.0826 0.0844 0.0896 0.0849 0.0732 0.0716 
RD 0.0346 0.0203 0.0285 0.0187 0.0279 0.0205 0.0266 0.0204 0.0410 0.0284 0.0264 0.0187 
CapExp 0.0605 0.0501 0.0615 0.0522 0.0603 0.0461 0.0551 0.0489 0.0533 0.0474 0.0498 0.0424 
Acquisition 0.0200 0.0000 0.0234 0.0000 0.0198 0.0000 0.0210 0.0000 0.0220 0.0000 0.0180 0.0000 
Dividend 0.5170 0.3232 0.4401 0.2000 0.4089 0.1600 0.4864 0.2400 0.4356 0.0000 0.4033 0.0800 
LTD 0.2222 0.1918 0.2334 0.2111 0.2448 0.2222 0.2558 0.2069 0.3013 0.2819 0.3031 0.2789 
LTDissue 0.0893 0.0289 0.0943 0.0410 0.0789 0.0176 0.0849 0.0289 0.1195 0.0366 0.1182 0.0472 
FV 458.5 75.4 526.6 83.3 403.2 35.0 581.7 58.5 553.6 67.3 469.7 63.0 
PBO 469.8 79.3 515.7 94.3 421.2 40.2 706.4 72.8 650.7 77.6 502.2 72.9 
FvToTa 0.1424 0.0958 0.1654 0.1143 0.1131 0.0858 0.1600 0.1184 0.1454 0.0846 0.1617 0.1336 
PboToTa 0.1437 0.0997 0.1628 0.1097 0.1246 0.0913 0.1634 0.1380 0.1522 0.1081 0.1837 0.1536 
FvToPbo 0.9685 0.9665 0.9611 0.9290 0.8817 0.8838 0.8958 0.9039 0.8389 0.8310 0.8705 0.8522 
FR -0.0308 -0.0016 -0.0211 -0.0035 -0.0251 -0.0077 -0.0967 -0.0061 -0.0726 -0.0137 -0.1491 -0.0162 
Fstatus -0.0010 -0.0011 0.0003 -0.0030 -0.0105 -0.0062 -0.0047 -0.0067 -0.0121 -0.0085 -0.0156 -0.0152 
OBSliab -0.0015 0.0004 0.0031 0.0038 0.0064 0.0032 0.0053 0.0054 0.0092 0.0102 0.0033 0.0039 
CompRate 4.7409 4.7500 4.8028 5.0000 4.7142 5.0000 4.7039 4.5000 4.5133 4.6000 4.8455 5.0000 
DiscRate 7.3840 7.5000 7.4957 7.5000 7.3982 7.5000 7.4090 7.5000 7.5369 7.5000 7.4630 7.5000 
IntCost 0.0103 0.0070 0.0114 0.0079 0.0085 0.0065 0.0117 0.0099 0.0107 0.0073 0.0131 0.0108 
PenCost 0.0031 0.0021 0.0032 0.0026 0.0040 0.0029 0.0037 0.0034 0.0040 0.0031 0.0047 0.0042 
ServCost 0.0047 0.0038 0.0046 0.0038 0.0040 0.0033 0.0049 0.0045 0.0048 0.0037 0.0052 0.0046 
OthPCost 0.0026 0.0004 0.0027 0.0007 0.0022 0.0009 0.0036 0.0010 0.0024 0.0004 0.0033 0.0015 
PriorSC 0.0039 0.0016 0.0037 0.0013 0.0028 0.0008 0.0041 0.0025 0.0031 0.0031 0.0059 0.0042 
ERR 8.8560 9.0000 8.9722 9.0000 8.8052 9.0000 8.7570 8.6000 9.1469 9.0000 8.9412 9.0000 
RET 0.0547 0.0241 0.0643 0.0239 0.0501 0.0417 0.0259 0.0186 0.0828 0.0350 0.0169 0.0040 
ROA 0.0090 0.0088 0.0097 0.0099 0.0075 0.0089 0.0088 0.0107 0.0073 0.0090 0.0035 0.0072 
ROE 0.0284 0.0310 0.0318 0.0337 0.0178 0.0247 0.0120 0.0263 0.0217 0.0275 0.0260 0.0272 
Range 725 - 2306 276 – 898 145 – 494 191 – 428 96 – 241 278 - 694 
 
Panel B. Descriptive Statistics of Six Mandated Contribution (MC) Groups Calculated from Form 5500 Schedule B Data. 
 MC 1 MC 2 MC 3 MC 4 MC 5 MC 6 
Vartable mean median mean median mean median mean median mean median mean median 
GWAY 0.7803 0.6407 0.7495 0.6190 0.6823 0.5738 0.6958 0.6204 0.6446 0.5201 0.6042 0.4975 
McToCurAst 0.0033 0.0000 0.0071 0.0000 0.0127 0.0000 0.0130 0.0000 0.0198 0.0003 0.0231 0.0062 
DrcToCurAst 0.0128 0.0000 0.0231 0.0000 0.0361 0.0000 0.0374 0.0000 0.0603 0.0068 0.0767 0.0326 
OldLiaToCurAst 0.0006 0.0000 0.0014 0.0000 0.0018 0.0000 0.0039 0.0000 0.0060 0.0000 0.0151 0.0012 
NewLiaToCurAst 0.0054 0.0000 0.0126 0.0000 0.0175 0.0000 0.0211 0.0000 0.0422 0.0000 0.0426 0.0146 
Range 2563 - 2784 1016 - 1122 637 - 711 529 - 626 270 - 334 733 - 916 
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Panel B of Table 10 displays statistics for the 6 firm groups using Schedule B data. 
There is clearly a trend indicating that the ratios of MC, DRC, old liability and new liability 
to current fund asset value are increasing from MC1 to MC6, with MC1 values being the 
smallest and MC6 the largest.  On the other hand, the Gateway percentages decrease from 
MC1 firms to MC6 firms, with the MC1 being the largest and the MC6 the smallest.    
Table 11 reports regression results from market, three-factors and four-factors 
models. Although there are differences in signs, magnitudes and statistical significance, the 
overall intercepts show that MC1 firms earn higher equally weighted returns than MC6 
firms. The pattern of returns is unclear for value-weighted returns. The estimated market 
betas for MC4, MC5 and MC6 are larger (lower) than the estimated market betas for MC1, 
MC2 and MC3 in all three models for the equally (value) weighted returns. This indicates 
that firms that make more consecutive mandated contributions are more (less) associated 
with the market performance in terms of equal (value) weighted returns. The coefficients of 
SMB and HML of equal weighted returns for MC6 are larger than those in the other groups 
in either three-factor model or four-factor model, indicating that the size effect and value 
effects are larger for MC6 firms.  
Adjusted returns for Market beta, three-factors and four-factors are shown in Table 
12. Both value and equally weighted adjusted returns of MC1 and MC2 firms are 
significantly positive for all three model equations. On the other hand, the adjusted returns 
for MC6 firms from three-factor and four-factor models are significant negative.  Why does 
the market appear to reward firms that make one or two years of MC?  Perhaps the market 
expects the MC to continue for a longer time, and is positively surprised when these firms 
stop making MC. Why is the market surprised at the firms that make more than 5 years of 
MC? Underfunded firms are required to amortize the shortfall of pension obligation within 
3-5 years. It is reasonable to assume that the market expects these firms to cover the deficit 
in 5 years and is negatively surprised by a longer MC period.   
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Table 11. Regression Coefficients and Adjusted R Squares of Market Model, Three -Factor Model and Four-Factor Model for Six 
Mandated Contribution Groups.   
 
The MC groups are defined as in Table 10. 
      VWRET             EWRET       
  MC 1  MC 2 MC 3  MC 4 MC 5 MC 6  MC 1  MC 2 MC 3  MC 4 MC 5 MC 6 
                  Market Model 
Intercept 0.0004 0.0023 0.0011 0.0038 0.0054 0.0034  0.0046 0.0056 0.0038 0.0043 0.0065 0.0007 
  (0.261) (1.042) (0.509) (1.953) (2.536) (1.365)  (3.088) (3.504) (1.720) (1.878) (2.504) (0.297) 
Market  0.9941 0.7452 0.7542 0.7389 0.6507 0.6588  0.8400 0.7789 0.6995 0.9028 0.9734 0.8628 
  (27.047) (13.785) (14.655) (15.274) (12.383) (10.630)  (23.099) (19.938) (13.014) (16.157) (15.350) (14.977) 
Adj R
2
 0.7629 0.4544 0.4850 0.5058 0.4016 0.3304  0.7011 0.6359 0.4258 0.5339 0.5083 0.4959 
                Three-Factor Model 
Intercept 0.0009 0.0003 -0.0038 0.0017 0.0030 0.0013  0.0008 0.0022 -0.0011 0.0004 0.0038 -0.0049 
  (0.628) (0.124) (-2.285) (0.955) (1.416) (0.548)  (0.743) (1.679) (-0.634) (0.225) (1.585) (-2.773) 
Market 1.0101 0.9026 1.0297 0.9072 0.7757 0.8306  0.9983 0.9139 0.8941 1.0348 1.0353 1.0840 
  (25.536) (15.737) (22.378) (18.490) (13.380) (12.600)  (33.907) (26.093) (18.837) (19.182) (15.689) (22.558) 
smb -0.2477 -0.1866 0.0996 -0.2119 0.1078 -0.2340  0.3573 0.3693 0.5110 0.5127 0.5068 0.5928 
  (-5.716) (-2.969) (1.975) (-3.942) (1.698) (-3.240)  (11.078) (9.626) (9.828) (8.675) (7.010) (11.261) 
hml -0.0686 0.3165 0.7419 0.3329 0.3640 0.3320  0.5585 0.5047 0.7182 0.5604 0.3804 0.8215 
  (-1.276) (4.062) (11.868) (4.994) (4.622) (3.707)  (13.963) (10.608) (11.138) (7.647) (4.243) (12.584) 
Adj R
2
 0.7922 0.5351 0.6884 0.6153 0.4489 0.4267  0.8518 0.7786 0.6612 0.6712 0.5970 0.7346 
                    Four-Factor Model 
Intercept 0.0031 -0.0007 -0.0035 0.0012 0.0030 0.0019  0.0026 0.0032 0.0005 0.0030 0.0066 -0.0028 
  (2.313) (-0.305) (-2.041) (0.666) (1.372) (0.783)  (2.614) (2.456) (0.284) (1.564) (2.815) (-1.616) 
Market 0.9485 0.9282 1.0210 0.9207 0.7758 0.8134  0.9488 0.8857 0.8497 0.9644 0.9572 1.0249 
  (25.702) (15.804) (21.538) (18.244) (12.972) (11.991)  (35.194) (25.132) (17.953) (18.556) (14.863) (21.958) 
smb -0.2223 -0.1971 0.1031 -0.2174 0.1078 -0.2269  0.3777 0.3809 0.5293 0.5417 0.5389 0.6171 
  (-5.637) (-3.140) (2.036) (-4.031) (1.686) (-3.130)  (13.107) (10.114) (10.464) (9.752) (7.829) (12.371) 
hml -0.1140 0.3353 0.7355 0.3429 0.3641 0.3193  0.5220 0.4840 0.6855 0.5085 0.3229 0.7779 
  (-2.320) (4.289) (11.654) (5.103) (4.573) (3.536)  (14.543) (10.315) (10.879) (7.350) (3.766) (12.520) 
umd -0.2015 0.0835 -0.0284 0.0443 0.0005 -0.0565  -0.1618 -0.0922 -0.1452 -0.2303 -0.2552 -0.1932 
  (-7.048) (1.835) (-0.774) (1.133) (0.010) (-1.075)  (-7.749) (-3.378) (-3.961) (-5.721) (-5.116) (-5.343) 
Adj R
2
 0.8293 0.5400 0.6879 0.6158 0.4464 0.4271   0.8827 0.7884 0.6821 0.7120 0.6377 0.7637 
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Table 12. Value-Weighted and Equally-Weighted Returns Adjusted by Market, Three-Factors and Four-Factors for Six Mandated 
Contribution (MC) Groups. 
   
The MC groups are defined as in Table 10. 
     VWRET             EWRET       
  MC 1  MC 2 MC 3  MC 4 MC 5 MC 6  MC 1  MC 2 MC 3  MC 4 MC 5 MC 6 
            
                  Market Adjusted Returns 
MEAN 0.0034 0.0060 0.0046 0.0028 0.0067 0.0004  0.0044 0.0058 0.0049 0.0018 0.0046 -0.0011 
  (6.924) (7.766) (4.181) (2.100) (3.625) (0.365)  (9.061) (7.460) (4.482) (1.349) (2.492) (-0.998) 
MEDIAN 0.0012 0.0041 0.0021 0.0006 0.0028 0.0011  0.0021 0.0039 0.0023 -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0004 
                  
                  Three-Factor Adjusted Returns 
MEAN 0.0038 0.0042 -0.0007 0.0004 0.0045 -0.0018  0.0010 0.0028 -0.0001 -0.0017 0.0024 -0.0059 
  (7.634) (5.389) (-0.613) (0.325) (2.463) (-1.578)  (2.007) (3.605) (-0.109) (-1.254) (1.332) (-5.208) 
MEDIAN 0.0017 0.0022 -0.0028 -0.0013 -0.0008 -0.0012  -0.0013 0.0011 -0.0019 -0.0035 -0.0028 -0.0061 
                
                 Four-Factor Adjusted Returns 
MEAN 0.0061 0.0033 -0.0004 0.0001 0.0045 -0.0012  0.0028 0.0038 0.0014 0.0009 0.0054 -0.0037 
  (12.415) (4.190) (-0.332) (0.074) (2.460) (-1.031)  (5.904) (4.902) (1.323) (0.697) (2.998) (-3.277) 
MEDIAN 0.0038 0.0013 -0.0023 -0.0018 -0.0008 -0.0006  0.0006 0.0023 -0.0003 -0.0011 0.0014 -0.0039 
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5.2 Analyst Earnings Forecasts, Forecast Errors and Revisions across MCX Groups 
In this section I examine analyst forecasts and revisions across different MCX 
groups as defined in previous sub-section. The questions investigated are how and when 
analysts take mandatory contribution into consideration and whether they distinguish 
between different MCX groups. If analysts don’t take the implications of MC requirements 
into consideration when making the initial forecast, they will forecast higher earnings for 
MC firms, resulting in greater forecast errors. If analysts subsequently incorporate MC-
related information into forecasts, they should make revisions to their initial forecast, 
resulting in reduced forecast error.     
Table 13 reports analyst forecast data after the first MC occurrence for the 6 MC 
groups. I omitted the median forecasts from the table because they are very similar to the 
mean forecasts in magnitude and trend and show similar results. Panel A shows the first 
quarter earnings forecast after the first MC occurrence. Mean forecasts for the 6 MC groups 
are all positive, ranging from 0.23 to 0.36. But the mean forecast for MC6 firms is the 
largest and that of MC5 is the second largest, indicating analysts don’t anticipate these 
firms will be more financially constrained than other firms. All mean forecast errors (FE) 
are positive (although not statistically significant), with the MC6 group showing the largest 
FE value. The mean of absolute forecast errors (AbsFE) reveals that analyst forecast MC5 
and MC6 firms less accurately than other MC firms. Panel B reports the averaged quarterly 
forecasts from quarter two to quarter four after first MC occurred. Analyst forecasts for 
MC5 and MC6 firms are still higher than for other MC firms, with FE and AbsFE of MC6 
showing less forecast accuracy for this group than for other MC firms. Panel C reports the 
averaged quarterly forecasts for the third year after the first MC occurrence. In contrast 
with the data in Panel A and B in which analyst forecast mean is highest for MC6 firms, 
analysts now appear to recognize these heavily underfunded MC firms and project lower 
earnings for this group than for other MC firms. The overall s maller AbsFE values  
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Table 13. Analyst Quarterly Earnings Forecasts after First MC Occurrence for the Six 
Mandated Contribution (MC) Groups.  
 
The MC groups are defined in Table 10. Forecast is the average of the forecasted quarterly 
earnings; FE is the forecasted earnings mean minus actual earnings per share scaled by the price 
of the previous month multiplied by 100; AbsFE is the absolute value of FE. All numbers are 
means with t values in parentheses. 
  MC1 MC2 MC3 MC4 MC5 MC6 
Panel A. Quarterly Earnings Forecast for First Quarter after the First MC Occurrence 
Forecast 0.28 0.26 0.29 0.23 0.35 0.36 
  (12.86) (7.19) (5.23) (6.49) (6.72) (6.78) 
FE 0.02 0.11 0.05 0.01 0.09 0.21 
  (0.21) (1.04) (0.50) (0.09) (0.51) (0.89) 
AbsFE 0.40 0.42 0.33 0.29 0.52 0.66 
  (4.96) (4.73) (3.73) (4.23) (3.87) (3.26) 
 
Panel B. Quarterly Earnings Forecast from Second through Fourth Quarter after the First MC 
Occurrence 
Mean 0.32 0.31 0.30 0.23 0.35 0.35 
  (22.59) (14.83) (11.46) (7.06) (8.37) (9.60) 
FE 0.00 -0.06 -0.02 0.13 0.12 0.65 
  (0.03) (-0.27) (-0.10) (0.80) (0.86) (2.39) 
AbsFE 0.39 0.57 0.47 0.58 0.38 0.79 
  (6.13) (2.90) (3.29) (3.99) (2.60) (2.96) 
 
Panel C. Quarterly Earnings Forecast for the Third Year after the First MC Occurrence 
Mean 0.33 0.38 0.35 0.37 0.35 0.33 
  (26.43) (17.73) (9.54) (10.70) (7.57) (11.73) 
FE -0.03 -0.03 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 0.02 
  (-1.42) (-0.92) (-0.74) (-0.55) (-1.07) (0.27) 
AbsFE 0.20 0.18 0.31 0.29 0.24 0.22 
  (10.97) (6.78) (5.62) (3.41) (6.25) (3.87) 
       
Panel D. Quarterly Earnings Forecast for the Fifth Year after the First MC Occurrence 
Mean 0.37 0.39 0.40 0.34 0.43 0.41 
  (23.87) (15.56) (8.73) (10.22) (8.72) (11.07) 
FE -0.03 -0.06 -0.04 -0.06 -0.05 0.04 
  (-1.66) (-1.89) (-1.34) (1.85) (-0.93) (0.90) 
AbsFE 0.16 0.17 0.12 0.16 0.18 0.24 
  (11.49) (6.95) (5.61) (5.39) (4.27) (5.77) 
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compared to that in Panel A and Panel B indicate that analyst forecasts improve two years 
after the firm’s first MC occurrence. Panel D reports the averaged quarterly forecasts for 
the fifth year after the first MC.  The AbsFE shows that the analysts continue improving 
forecast accuracy in the fifth year for the MC1 to MC5 firms but still have difficulty 
making forecasts for MC6 firms. FE is marginally significant negative for MC1 and MC2 
and MC4 firms showing that analysts tend to underestimate these MC firms after they stop 
being subject to the MC requirement.  The overall results show that analysts don’t 
immediately recognize the implications of MC and therefore overestimate forecasts 
initially. They incorporate the MC information into forecasts two years after the first MC 
occurrence, perhaps when MC-related information in DOL filings becomes more easily 
accessible. The deadline set by EBSA for filing the annual 5500 report is the last day of the 
seventh month after the close of the plan year. Also, a plan can request a two-and-one-half 
month extension by filing a Form 5558 before the due date. EBSA starts compiling, 
processing and examining the filings after receiving the reported forms. Partial data will be 
available one year after the close of the plan year, but the complete set of data is not easily 
available until the end of the second year
6
.    
Table 14 presents analyst quarterly revisions for different period after the first MC 
occurrence. Panel A shows the first quarter revisions. The number of revisions in MC3 
firms is the highest and in MC6 firms is the lowest. However, in terms of mean analyst 
following, MC1 (MC6) firms have the highest (lowest) following. NRev% that measures 
the revision frequency per analyst shows that analysts tend to revise forecast more 
frequently for MC3, MC4 and MC5 firms.  Mean revisions (Rev) are all negative, showing 
that analysts overestimate these firms initially and adjust their forecast downwards when 
the additional information become available. The larger Rev values for MC4 and MC6  
                                              
6
 Personal communication with the EBSA data specialist confirms that the time to release the complete data is 
about two years after the close of the plan year.  
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Table 14.   Analyst Quarterly Revisions for the Six MC Groups.  
 
The MC groups are defined in Table 10. NRev is the number of quarterly revisions by analysts.  Followings is 
the number of analysts who made at least one forecast for the quarter. NRev% is the ratio of NRev to 
Followings. Rev is calculated by subtracting the previous forecast from the new forecast and then dividing the 
difference by the price of the previous month.  AbsRev is the absolute values of revisions. NegRev% is the 
proportion of analysts who made negative revisions. PosRev% is the proportion of analysts who made 
positive revisions.  All numbers are means with t values in parentheses.  
 MC 1 MC 2 MC 3 MC 4 MC 5 MC 6 
       
Panel A. First Quarter Revisions after First MC       
NRev 2.72 2.56 3.29 3.18 2.42 1.84 
 (10.93) (6.73) (3.76) (5.75) (8.40) (7.52) 
       
Followings 6.98 6.66 5.79 6.00 5.33 5.21 
 (15.77) (9.17) (6.89) (8.56) (6.74) (5.71) 
       
NRev % 0.44 0.45 0.63 0.60 0.58 0.43 
 (14.96) (8.43) (4.63) (5.11) (6.26) (7.19) 
       
Rev -0.12 -0.12 -0.16 -0.46 -0.17 -0.37 
 (-2.72) (-1.71) (-2.23) (-2.62) (-1.39) (-2.83) 
       
AbsRev 0.25 0.30 0.30 0.31 0.31 0.32 
 (7.19) (21.07) (16.28) (12.11) (14.47) (14.86) 
       
NegRev % 61.22 54.88 56.19 77.14 55.17 68.57 
       
PosRev % 37.72 45.12 28.26 22.86 44.83 31.43 
       
Panel B. Second to Fourth Quarter  Revisions after First MC 
NRev 3.22 3.03 2.91 2.61 2.48 2.38 
 (17.27) (11.95) (7.53) (5.88) (7.37) (8.59) 
       
Followings 7.35 6.44 6.17 5.52 5.45 5.85 
 (25.60) (15.33) (11.21) (10.24) (9.48) (10.80) 
       
NRev % 0.51 0.59 0.60 0.52 0.53 0.50 
 (23.43) (14.70) (9.35) (7.61) (10.41) (11.59) 
       
Rev -0.04 -0.11 -0.12 -0.02 -0.14 -0.12 
 (-1.91) (-3.03) (-2.58) (-0.32) (-2.52) (-2.94) 
       
AbsRev 0.22 0.30 0.30 0.31 0.31 0.32 
 (13.27) (21.07) (16.28) (12.11) (14.47) (14.86) 
       
NegRev % 41.89 52.54 58.43 51.85 49.35 75.40 
       
PosRev % 46.55 41.74 39.55 48.15 50.65 24.60 
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Table 14.   (Continued) 
 
Panel C. Third Year Revisions after First MC 
NRev  3.50 2.90 3.07 2.69 3.13 3.21 
 (20.02) (11.58) (8.48) (8.64) (9.64) (9.10) 
       
Followings 8.25 7.32 7.36 7.33 7.46 7.31 
 (30.53) (18.20) (16.88) (13.13) (13.77) (12.47) 
       
NRev % 0.48 0.51 0.44 0.40 0.47 0.53 
 (24.47) (13.43) (10.18) (11.10) (10.88) (11.35) 
       
Rev -0.10 -0.12 -0.08 0.01 -0.11 -0.10 
 (-5.02) (-3.00) (-1.87) 0.42  (-1.91) (-2.13) 
       
AbsRev 0.21 0.30 0.30 0.31 0.31 0.32 
 (12.39) (21.07) (16.28) (12.11) (14.47) (14.86) 
       
NegRev % 58.04 65.28 64.53 50.44 45.33 65.24 
       
PosRev % 35.89 29.88 35.47 49.56 54.67 35.22 
       
Panel D. Fifth Year Revisions after First MC 
NRev 3.11 2.81 2.13 3.22 3.50 2.24 
 (16.17) (9.24) (10.72) (7.11) (7.75) (8.00) 
       
Followings 8.95 7.12 5.67 6.34 6.87 7.02 
 (22.83) (12.47) (9.40) (10.51) (10.18) (11.69) 
       
NRev % 0.44 0.46 0.43 0.56 0.53 0.45 
 (19.98) (12.01) (13.92) (8.51) (9.89) (8.76) 
       
Rev -0.08 -0.13 -0.04 -0.02 -0.01 -0.12 
 (-4.81) (-2.80) (-1.04) (-0.38) (-0.29) (-2.48) 
       
AbsRev 0.17 0.30 0.30 0.31 0.31 0.32 
 (10.46) (21.07) (16.28) (12.11) (14.47) (14.86) 
       
NegRev % 58.53 51.36 61.45 47.10 53.33 72.81 
       
PosRev % 37.16 47.04 38.55 36.08 46.67 29.54 
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firms further suggest that analysts fail to differentiate between these MC firms and other 
MC firms when forecasting and make the larger revision for these groups when receiving 
the new information. The absolute revision (AbsRev) shows that analysts make smaller 
revisions for MC1 firms and the information based on which they make forecasts for this 
group of firms is more accurate than for other MC firms.  Proportions of negative revisions 
are higher than positive revisions, consistent with the finding that analyst forecasts are 
generally overestimated.  
Panel B shows the average revisions from second quarter to fourth quarter after the 
first MC occurrence. The results show that analyst revisions get smaller for all MC firm 
groups. However, AbsRev values are similar to those for the first quarter, except for a 
three-cent improvement for MC1 firms. The initial forecasts are still overestimated as 
shown by the negative Rev. The percentage of the negative revision (NegRev%)  for MC6 
firms is 33.5% higher than for MC1 firms, indicating that MC6 firms are more difficult to 
forecast.   
Panel C shows the average quarterly revisions in the third year after the first MC 
occurrence. The number of revisions by per analyst (NRev%) shows that analysts now 
revise more frequently than in the first quarter or the second to fourth quarter, possibly due 
to greater availability of MC-related information. Within the six MC groups, NRev% is 
highest for MC6 firms, and their forecasts are still generally overestimated. The magnitude 
of revisions is smallest for MC1 firms as shown by AbsRev.  
Panel D shows that five years after the first MC occurrence, analysts make the 
smallest revisions for MC1 firms and the largest revisions for MC6 firms.  The second line 
from the bottom of the table reveals that 73% of analyst revisions for MC6 firms are 
negative, 10% to 26% more than for the other five MC firm groups. This result, together 
with less frequent revisions than in year three, large negative revisions and largest absolute 
value revisions, indicate that although analysts utilize the available MC information in 
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forecasts and revisions, they have difficulty in forecasting MC6 firms correctly, perhaps 
due to the continuing MC requirement for these firms after five consecutive years of MC.   
The overall results from analyst forecasts and revisions suggest that analysts don’t 
recognize the implications of MC immediately but gradually incorporate this information 
into their forecasts. They seem to distinguish between the two extreme groups, MC1 and 
MC6 firms, and make the smallest and largest revisions accordingly, although they have 
difficulty distinguishing between the groups in between.  
Figure 3 and Figure 4 depict analysts’ quarterly forecast errors 24 quarters after the 
first MC for the 6 MC groups. Forecasts errors for the MC1 to MC3 groups are reduced 
one year after the firms’ first MC occurrence. There is also a shift towards predominantly 
negative FE. The smaller FEs for the MC1 group show that analysts forecast those firms 
more accurately than MC2and MC3 firms. In contrast, the forecast errors are much larger 
and more volatile for MC4, MC5 and MC6 firms over the whole period as shown in figure 
4. 
Figures 5 and Figure 6 depict analysts’ quarterly revisions 24 quarters after the first 
MC occurrence for the six MC groups. The two figures show that most revisions are 
downwards, confirming that analysts overestimate initially and revise their forecasts 
downwards when additional information is available. In comparison w ith revisions for 
MC1 to MC3 firms shown in Figure 5, Figure 6 indicates that revisions for MC4 to MC6 
firms are larger in magnitude and more volatile.  Overall, quarterly forecast errors and 
revisions show that analyst forecasts become less accurate and more volatile as firms make 
more consecutive years of MC. 
 
5.3 Institutional Investor Holdings across MCX Groups  
Institutional investors are financially sophisticated. Because they hold large  
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Figure 3. Analyst Quarterly Forecast Errors (FE) for MC1, MC2 and MC3 Firms from 
Quarter 0 to Quarter 24 afer the First MC. 
 
 Forecast error is calculated as indicated by equation (4).  
 
 
 
Figure 4. Analyst Quarterly Forecast Errors (FE) for MC4, MC5and MC6 Firms from 
Quarter 0 to Quarter 24 after the First MC.  
 
Forecast error is calculated as indicated by equation (4).   
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Figure 5. Analyst Quarterly Revisions for MC1, MC2 and MC3 Firms from Quarter 0 to 
Quarter 24 after the First MC.  
 
Revision is calculated by equation (6).  
 
 
 
Figure 6. Analyst Quarterly Revisions for MC4, MC5 and MC6 Firms from Quarter 0 to 
Quarter 24 after the First MC. 
 
 Revision is calculated by equation (6).  
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financial assets they are believed to be more prudent in making investment decisions.  
Their relatively large financial responsibilities compel them to pay more attention to 
complex information such as pension related obligations. Since different classes and styles 
of investors have different investment goals and strategies, they may interpret and react to 
MC information differently.  I conduct institutional investor related analyses using three 
institutional classes classified by Bushee (1998) and four institutional styles classified by 
Abarbanell, Bushee and Raedy, (2003), with all classification data provided by Bushee.  
Panel A of Table 15 presents Percent of Institutional Holddings (PIH) by three 
classes and four styles. There is no a clear trend of holdings for different classes and styles 
of investors from MC1 to MC6 firms, except for the last column of the table that shows 
that the holdings of large and small growth investors is significantly lower in MC6 than in 
the other MC groups, indicating that these firms are perceived to lack growth opportunities.  
Panel B of Table 15 shows the change of PIH (CPIH) for institutional class and 
style groups.  Like PIH there is no clear trend across MC firm groups. All investor groups 
change their holdings, mostly in MC5 firms but this is likely due to their higher initial 
holding in MC5 firms as shown in Panel A. TRA investors whose holdings in MC firms are 
less than half those of QIX investors do show higher turnover than DED and QIX 
investors, consistent with their investment strategy.  Small investors, with lower holdings in 
all six MC firm groups, also show higher turnover than large investors.  Overall, the 
evidence suggests that intuitional investors don’t adjust their holdings differently across 
these MC firm groups.   
 
5.4 Interrupted Versus Continuous Mandated Contribution  
Table 4 shows that firms with the same number of MC years (columns) can fall in 
different MC periods (rows). For example, firms with three MC years can make MC in one 
period of three consecutive years (MC3 in preceding analyses), or in two periods of two  
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Table 15. Percent of Institutional Holdings (PIH) and Change of PIH (CPIH) by Investment Class and 
Style for the Six Mandated Contribution (MC) Groups .  
 
The MC groups are defined in Table 10. The three classes and four styles of PIH are as defined by Bushee 
(1998) and Abarbanell, Bushee and Ready (2003). DED represents dedicated institutions that have low 
turnover and more concentrated portfolio holdings, QIX  (TRA) represent quasi-indexer (transient) 
institutions with low (high) turnover and diversified portfolio holdings. LVA represents institutions that 
prefer large firms, which are high on the value and fiduciary dimensions and low on historical growth-risk 
dimension. LGR represents institutions that hold large firms that have greater future growth potential than 
firms held by large-value institutions. SVA represents institutions that prefer small-cap firms (though not as 
small as small-growth funds) that are high on the value dimension and low on the prior growth risk 
dimension. SGR represents institutions that tend to hold small firms with high historical and expected 
returns. The last column shows the results of t test of differences between PIH of MC1 and PIH of MC2, 
MC3, MC4, MC5 and MC6. “Yes” means all five tests are significant at level 0.1 or lower. “No” means at 
least one test is not significant.   
    MC1 MC2 MC3 MC4 MC5 MC6 Ave MC6 VS 
Panel A. PIH             MC1-MC5 
  DED 0.0853 0.0846 0.0912 0.0872 0.1029 0.0898 0.0872 No 
Class QIX 0.2498 0.2378 0.2604 0.2790 0.2569 0.2382 0.2499 No 
  TRA 0.1030 0.0988 0.1070 0.1042 0.1276 0.0991 0.1033 No 
  LVA 0.1411 0.1325 0.1400 0.1476 0.1550 0.1379 0.1401 No 
Style LGR 0.1139 0.1110 0.1042 0.1181 0.1288 0.0988 0.1117 Yes 
  SVA 0.0876 0.0857 0.1088 0.0914 0.0934 0.0980 0.0911 No 
  SGR 0.0912 0.0909 0.0977 0.0979 0.1067 0.0834 0.0921 Yes 
  Ave 0.1086 0.1051 0.1126 0.1139 0.1209 0.1045 0.1088  
                  
Panel B. CPIH          
  DED 0.0027 0.0029 0.0031 0.0029 0.0047 0.0032 0.0029 No 
Class QIX 0.0077 0.0078 0.0080 0.0070 0.0079 0.0078 0.0077 No 
  TRA 0.0076 0.0071 0.0081 0.0075 0.0103 0.0068 0.0076 No 
  LVA 0.0033 0.0034 0.0037 0.0036 0.0040 0.0035 0.0034 No 
Style LGR 0.0030 0.0033 0.0031 0.0026 0.0036 0.0030 0.0031 No 
  SVA 0.0047 0.0051 0.0058 0.0047 0.0060 0.0047 0.0049 No 
  SGR 0.0066 0.0063 0.0067 0.0062 0.0093 0.0061 0.0066 No 
  Ave 0.0044 0.0045 0.0048 0.0043 0.0057 0.0043 0.0045  
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consecutive years and of one year, or in three periods of one year. Even for firms with the 
same number of MC years and the same number of MC periods, the number of non-MC 
years between periods may differ.  Being free from the MC obligation temporarily may or 
may not help the firm in the long term. Furthermore, more erratic MC patterns could raise 
hurdles in the valuation of these firms. In this section, I investigate the effect of recurring 
MC by comparing non-recurring MC firms with recurring MC firms. 
First, I constructed four more MC groups, named MC2R, MC3R, MC4R and 
MC5R to indicate  that these firm groups have same number of MC years over the sample 
period as MC2, MC3, MC4 and MC5, respectively, except that MC years are continuous 
for the latter set of firms, but are interspersed with non-MC years for the former group of 
firms. Note that a MC1R group is not feasible by definition, and a MC6R group would not 
be directly comparable to the MC6 because the latter contains firms with continuous MC 
years ranging from 6 to 15. Consequently, I restrict these analyses to comparisons between 
MC2-MC5 firms and MC2R – MC5R firms, respectively.  
Table 16 presents descriptive statistics for the MC2R-MC5R firm groups, using 
Schedule B data.  Columns 2 through 5 show that as the number of MC years increases, the 
recurring firms’ Gateway percentage (ratio of fund current assets to current liabilities) 
decreases. As a result, recurring firms with longer MC years have larger contribution 
requirements. In comparison with consecutive firms with the same number of MC years, I 
find that the recurring firms are characterized by equal or higher Gateway values, lower old 
and new liability values, as well as lower DRC and MC values.   
Table 17 displays the value-weighted and equally-weighted adjusted returns from 
the market model, three-factor model and four-factor model for the recurring firms. 
Columns 2 to 5 show that recurring firms generally earn lower excess returns as the number 
of MC years increases, with the pattern being more consistent for equally-weighted returns. 
The last four columns show the differences of excess returns between MCX and MCXR  
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Table 16.  Characteristics of the Recurring Mandatory Contribution Group Firms Us ing Form 5500 
Schedule B Data.   
 
MC2R consists of recurring MC firms with 2 MC years in 2 non-adjacent periods, MC3R consists of firms 
with 3 MC years in 2 or 3 periods, MC4R consists of firms with 4 MC years in 2 or more periods and MC5R 
consists of firms with 5 MC years in 2 or more periods.  McToCurAst is the ratio of MC to current assets; 
GWAY is the proportion of current assets to current liability; DrcToCurAst is deficit reduction contribution 
to current assets; OldLiaToCurAst is old liability to current assets; NewLiaToCurAst is new liability to 
current assets. t statistics are reported in parentheses.    
  MC2R MC3R MC4R MC5R  MC2R-MC2  MC3R-MC3  MC4R-MC4  MC5R-MC5  
GWAY 0.7313 0.6998 0.6938 0.6163 0.0095 0.0503 0.0411 0.0076 
  (43.192) (54.768) (48.573) (40.582) (0.455) (2.794) (2.079) (0.317) 
           
McToCurAst 0.0044 0.0070 0.0096 0.0121 -0.0032 -0.0069 -0.0043 -0.0106 
  (5.654) (7.375) (9.574) (7.501) (-2.828) (-3.862) (-2.359) (-3.353) 
           
DrcToCurAst 0.0101 0.0178 0.0283 0.0310 -0.0063 -0.0123 -0.0053 -0.0223 
  (8.460) (8.941) (10.936) (9.689) (-3.426) (-3.576) (-1.344) (-3.640) 
           
OldLiaToCurAst 0.0008 0.0006 0.0019 0.0038 -0.0006 -0.0013 -0.0020 -0.0023 
  (3.564) (4.001) (4.810) (5.897) (-1.810) (-3.245) (-2.832) (-1.967) 
           
NewLiaToCurAst 0.0325 0.0441 0.0703 0.0759 -0.0176 -0.0257 -0.0140 -0.0416 
  (7.640) (10.077) (11.890) (10.247) (-2.999) (-3.339) (-1.497) (-2.979) 
 
 
Table 17.  Value-Weighted and Equally-Weighted Returns Adjusted by Market, Three-Factors and 
Four-Factors for Four Recurring Mandatory Contribution Groups Defined in Table 16 and Matching 
MC Groups Defined in Table 10.   
 
t statistics are reported in parentheses.  
Adjusted Returns MC2R MC3R MC4R MC5R MC2R-MC2  MC3R-MC3  MC4R-MC4  MC5R-MC5  
           
     VWRET      
Market  0.0039 0.0025 0.0024 0.0021 -0.0021 -0.0021 -0.0005 -0.0046 
  (3.140) (2.265) (1.747) (1.338) (-1.443) (-1.371) (-0.243) (-1.913) 
           
Three-Factors  -0.0010 0.0030 -0.0019 -0.0010 -0.0052 0.0036 -0.0023 -0.0056 
  (-0.813) (2.703) (-1.407) (-0.669) (-3.555) (2.361) (-1.218) (-2.316) 
           
Four-Factors  0.0015 0.0026 -0.0001 -0.0015 -0.0017 0.0030 -0.0002 -0.0061 
  (1.253) (2.389) (-0.110) (-0.970) (-1.183) (1.940) (-0.130) (-2.507) 
           
     EWRET       
Market  0.0055 0.0034 0.0008 0.0010 -0.0003 -0.0015 -0.0010 -0.0036 
  (4.427) (1.036) (0.580) (0.655) (-0.198) (-0.968) (-0.535) (-1.478) 
           
Three-Factors  -0.0004 -0.0017 -0.0039 -0.0038 -0.0032 -0.0016 -0.0022 -0.0063 
  (-0.321) (-1.045) (-2.929) (-2.491) (-2.190) (-1.056) (-1.195) (-2.620) 
           
Four-Factors  0.0016 -0.0005 -0.0007 -0.0014 -0.0022 -0.0019 -0.0016 -0.0069 
  (1.296) (-1.039) (-0.541) (-0.929) (-1.519) (-1.284) (-0.871) (-2.893) 
 53 
 
firms. Almost all signs are negative, showing that recurring MC firms earn less excess 
returns than consecutive MC firms. Why do the recurring firms earn lower returns in spite 
of higher funding status and lower liability than consecutive firms as shown in Table 16?  
A possible explanation is that the market views recurring firms more unfavorably if they 
are unable to sustain their recovery from the MC requirement.  Furthermore, unlike the 
adjusted returns that show a decreasing trend from MC2R to MC5R, the differences in 
adjusted returns don’t necessarily show a decreasing trend, although the largest differences 
generally occur in matched 5-year MC group. 
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CHAPTER 6 
FACTOR AND CLUSTER ANALYSIS GROUPINGS 
 
The analyses above show that the market returns of MC firms are affected not only 
by the number of MC years but also by their pattern. In analyzing the recurring firms in 
section 4.3, I grouped the recurring MC firms according to the number of MC years 
without considering any other factors. For example, for the MC2R firms the number of 
non-MC years between the two MC years is not the same across all firms in the group. It is 
likely that the distance between consecutive MC periods is a relevant factor, as well as 
several other considerations. Therefore, a grouping that incorporates more relevant factors 
is likely to be useful.  
I use the following variables in factor analysis in an attempt to capture common 
factors across MC firms: MCYEAR, the total number of MC years in the sample period; 
NPMC, the number of MC periods; GWAY, average Gateway percentage that triggers the 
MC requirement and also reflects the firm’s pension underfunded status; GWAY2, the 
average Gateway percent if the firm’s Gateway percentage value falls below 100% in any 
sample year
7
; DURATION, the ratio of MCYEAR over NPMC, capturing the persistence 
and continuation of the MC requirement;  DIST, the average number of years between 
successive MC recurrences; and MCYPCT, the ratio of MC years to total number of years 
in the data.  
Panel A of Table 18 reports the correlations of the seven variables used for factor 
analysis. Not surprisingly MCYEAR is strongly correlated with DURATION and 
MCYPCT, DURATION is strongly correlated with MCYPCT, and GWAY is strongly  
                                              
7
 Since GWAY values are averaged over years for a firm, two firms with the same GWAY average may have 
different MC status at given points in time. For example, compare a firm with GWAY values of 120% and 
80% over two years with another firms with a constant 100% GWAY value for both years. Both have the 
same average GWAY value, but the MC requirement is triggered for the first firm in one year, but not at all 
for the second firm. 
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Table 18. The Results of Factor and Cluster Analyses of Mandatory Contribution (MC) Firms.   
 
Panel A. Correlations of Factor Analysis Variables. NPMC is the number of MC periods. MCYEAR is the 
total number of MC years in the data period. Duration is the ratio of MCYEAR to NPMC. DIST is the 
average number of non-MC years between MC contribution periods. MCYPCT is the ratio of MCYEAR to 
total number of years in the data. GWAY is the average of gateway percentage defined as pension fund asset 
over liability from Schedule B of Form 5500H before 1999 or Form 5500 since. GWAY2 is the average of 
gateway percentage for years with GWAY less than 1.00 only.  
 
Panel C. Factor Loadings of Clusters 
Cluster OCCURR GWAYPCT NPERST Firms Firms(%) 
LEN -0.4803 0.3631 0.1380 581 68.43% 
PER 1.3944 -0.1941 -0.1519 182 21.44% 
REV 0.2940 -2.0426 -0.6111 86 10.13% 
 
Panel D. Cluster Means for the Factor Analysis Variables     
  LEN   PER  REV 
Variables mean std min max mean std min max mean std min max 
NPMC 1.79 0.90 1.00 7.00 1.67 0.77 1.00 4.00 1.26 0.47 1.00 3.00 
MCYEAR 3.55 1.55 2.00 9.00 8.75 2.57 4.0 15.00 4.51 2.25 2.00 12.00 
DURATION 2.22 0.97 1.00 5.00 6.10 2.83 2.33 15.00 3.84 2.12 1.00 12.00 
MCYPCT 0.35 0.18 0.13 1.00 0.77 0.17 0.39 1.00 0.71 0.24 0.17 1.00 
DIST 0.95 1.24 0.00 6.50 0.45 0.61 0.00 3.00 0.21 0.47 0.00 3.00 
GWAY  93.27 4.19 77.88 100.00 86.25 5.45 70.87 97.08 71.13 11.22 32.70 94.06 
GWAY2  86.30 7.21 50.50 100.00 82.89 6.22 64.64 95.91 60.68 15.47 10.26 80.20 
 
 
  NPMC MCYEAR DURATION MCYPCT DIST GWAY GWAY2  
NPMC   0.258 -0.380 -0.043 0.532 0.089 0.177 
MCYEAR     0.722 0.653 0.017 -0.311 -0.052 
DURATION       0.608 -0.336 -0.342 -0.162 
MCYPCT         -0.237 -0.576 -0.282 
DIST           0.170 0.153 
GWAY              0.811 
    
Panel B. Standardized Scoring Coefficients and Communality of Factors . Factor1: OCCURR = 
Occurrence. Factor 2: GWAYPT = Gateway percent contribution. Factor 3: NPERST = Non-persistence of 
MC.  
          Factors   Communality 
 Variables OCCURR GWYPCT NPERST Estimates Percent 
NPMC 0.0001 -0.0267 0.4488 0.7929 15.33% 
MCYEAR 0.5616 0.0294 0.5349 0.9078 17.55% 
DURATION 0.3253 0.0577 -0.6035 0.8775 16.96% 
MCYPCT 0.1256 -0.0017 -0.0900 0.6279 12.14% 
DIST -0.0273 0.0156 0.1151 0.3591 6.94% 
GWAY  -0.1259 0.6178 -0.1784 0.8565 16.56% 
GWAY2 0.0671 0.3446 0.0295 0.7511 14.52% 
Variance %  41.0% 33.4% 25.7%     
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correlated with GWAY2. Also as expected, there is a strong negative correlation between 
MCYPCT and GWAY. But the strong positive correlation between NPMC and DIST is a 
little surprising. As one would expect DIST, that measures the distance (non-MC years) 
between successive MC periods should decreases as NPMC increases. Reexamining the 
distribution of MC firms in Table 4, I find a V-shaped distribution between NPMC and 
MCYEAR. As MCYEAR increases, NPMC increases until period 5 then decreases 
gradually. The non-MC years between NPMC will increase if MCYEAR increases and 
NPMC stays the same, possibly explaining the positive correlation between NMPC and 
DIST.  NPMC is also moderately correlated with MCYEAR and negative correlated with 
DURATION.  GWAY and GWAY2 are negatively correlated with MCYEAR, MCYPCT 
and DURATION.  
Because many variables are highly correlated with absolute correlation coefficients 
greater than 0.5, I perform principal factor analysis with an oblique rotation to identify and 
interpret common factors (Bushee 1998). The factor analysis produces three common 
factors, reported in Panel B of Table 18. The OCCURR factor appears to capture the 
occurrence of MC, with factor loadings on MCYEAR and MCYPCT being the highest. The 
GWYPCT factor appears to measure proximity to the mandated contribution threshold, 
with factor loadings on GWAY and GWAY2 being the highest. The NPERST factor 
appears to captures non-persistence of firm’s MC strings, with the three highest factor 
loadings being provided by DURATION, NPMC and MCY. The large negative factor 
loading of DURATION in NPERST indicates these firms are recurring firms with both 
higher number of MC years and periods.  
After identifying the three common factors, I then perform cluster analysis using the 
standardized factor scores. Panel C of Table 18 reports the results of the cluster analysis. 
Cluster LENIENT (LEN) has highest GWYPCT, lowest OCCURR and highest NPERST 
values. Cluster PERPETUAL (PER) has the highest OCURR value, and low GWAY and 
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NPERST values.  Cluster REVERT (REV) has the lowest GWAYPCT (high pension 
shortfall), lowest NPERST, and high OCCURR.  The means of the factor analysis variables 
for the three clusters are shown in Panel D of Table 18.  The results confirm the cluster 
analysis groupings.  LEN firms have lower MCYEAR, lower DURATION, and higher 
GWAYPCT and DIST, indicating that these firms possess lower pension liability and are 
able to fulfill the pension funding requirement with short term mandatory contribution 
periods. PER firms have higher MCYEAR and MCYPCT, and large DIST and 
DURATION indicating that these firms tend to have more consecutive MC years. REV 
firms have the lowest GWAY and DIST, indicating that these firms have the highest 
pension shortfall and a new MC requirement recurs more quickly after a stop in MC. REV 
firms also have low DURATION.  
I now classifying all firms into five groups: NMC (firms with no mandated 
contribution during the sample period), ONCE (firms with just one MC year over the whole 
sample), and LEN, PER and REV (groups identified from the factor and cluster analyses).  
 
6.1 Descriptive Statistics   
Table 19 reports descriptive statistics for the NMC, ONCE, LEN, PER and REV 
firm groups. Several inferences can be drawn from the table. REV firms are smallest in 
size, report the lowest earnings and operating cash, pay the least dividends, issue most 
long-term debt, are most underfunded, incur highest pension related costs (interest, 
pension, service, other pension, prior service), and show lowest yearly returns, return on 
asset (ROA) and return on equity (ROE). NMC firms pay the most dividends, show the 
highest funding status, the least long-term debt, interest cost and pension cost and highest 
yearly returns. They are smaller than ONCE firms and report less net income, ROA and 
ROE than ONCE firms. Overall, however, NMC firm characteristics are very similar to 
those of ONCE firms.     
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Table 19. Descriptive Statistics of NMC, O NCE, LEN, PER and REV Firms.  
 
NMC represents the firms with no mandated contribution. ONCE includes firms that made only once mandated contribution. LEN, PER and REV are groups 
identified from factor and cluster analyses.   
               NMC ONCE LEN PER REV 
Variable  Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std 
TA 6553.28 14621.36 7138.17 16212.19 3878.29 10051.08 4261.16 9464.40 3691.89 11436.02 
MktCap 3199.02 6853.70 3756.23 7775.89 2972.82 6785.89 2966.35 7111.14 1099.23 3333.30 
NOA 0.5536 0.2948 0.6132 0.2568 0.6517 0.2334 0.6398 0.2266 0.5912 0.2788 
TotAccru -0.0501 0.0721 -0.0523 0.0709 -0.0529 0.0723 -0.0489 0.0757 -0.0530 0.1026 
NI 0.0416 0.0710 0.0443 0.0718 0.0409 0.0795 0.0292 0.0851 0.0116 0.1122 
OCF 0.0959 0.0714 0.1016 0.0732 0.0955 0.0695 0.0789 0.0703 0.0758 0.0822 
R&D 0.0337 0.0373 0.0366 0.0373 0.0275 0.0277 0.0252 0.0274 0.0310 0.0355 
CapExp 0.0591 0.0456 0.0607 0.0461 0.0603 0.0399 0.0504 0.0342 0.0554 0.0505 
Acquisn 0.0191 0.0528 0.0229 0.0550 0.0245 0.0575 0.0267 0.0628 0.0110 0.0404 
Dividend 0.6582 0.6222 0.5605 0.5995 0.4755 0.5672 0.4149 0.4864 0.3393 0.5341 
LTD 0.1992 0.1724 0.2059 0.1661 0.2381 0.1715 0.2592 0.1803 0.2455 0.2062 
LTDissue 0.0837 0.1400 0.0852 0.1420 0.0933 0.1558 0.0986 0.1507 0.1332 0.2160 
FV 436.75 1133.86 532.45 1236.79 568.74 1396.85 744.64 1679.51 255.23 1369.73 
PBO 454.23 1237.01 547.81 1280.53 570.66 1382.00 804.25 1782.77 332.94 1692.10 
FvToTa 0.1335 0.1411 0.1486 0.1557 0.1694 0.1533 0.1830 0.1502 0.0929 0.1212 
PboToTa 0.1281 0.1306 0.1485 0.1497 0.1726 0.1458 0.2005 0.1531 0.1194 0.1398 
FvToPbo 1.0232 0.2611 0.9738 0.2297 0.9427 0.2400 0.8936 0.2108 0.6682 0.2712 
FR 0.0173 0.2591 -0.0126 0.3740 -0.0386 0.4880 -0.0918 0.6329 -0.1820 0.5945 
Fstatus 0.0059 0.0415 -0.0003 0.0377 -0.0045 0.0459 -0.0149 0.0513 -0.0325 0.0430 
OBSliab -0.0051 0.0235 -0.0019 0.0235 0.0041 0.0277 0.0052 0.0243 0.0137 0.0243 
CompRate 4.7872 0.7712 4.7187 0.7172 4.7372 0.7335 4.7102 0.8368 4.8473 1.0422 
DiscRate 7.3435 0.7035 7.3451 0.7330 7.4188 0.7227 7.4268 0.7664 7.3950 0.8137 
IntCost 0.0688 0.0189 0.0731 0.0220 0.0762 0.0230 0.0805 0.0199 0.1096 0.0429 
PenCost 0.0020 0.0050 0.0030 0.0051 0.0036 0.0058 0.0050 0.0058 0.0053 0.0061 
ServCost 0.0488 0.0531 0.0484 0.0504 0.0447 0.0401 0.0403 0.0363 0.0654 0.1824 
OthPCost 0.0168 0.0598 0.0191 0.0581 0.0207 0.0582 0.0226 0.0565 0.0505 0.0732 
PriorSC 0.1470 0.3429 0.1690 0.3302 0.1779 0.3014 0.1535 0.3534 0.1815 0.3135 
ERR 8.6067 0.8061 8.5893 0.7750 8.7960 0.9604 9.0720 0.8160 8.4167 0.7536 
RET 0.0774 0.3577 0.0703 0.3817 0.0664 0.3945 0.0365 0.4028 0.0030 0.4559 
ROA 0.0096 0.0169 0.0101 0.0175 0.0094 0.0191 0.0068 0.0196 0.0020 0.0292 
ROE 0.0291 0.0627 0.0307 0.0755 0.0259 0.0793 0.0252 0.0937 0.0114 0.1176 
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Table 20 reports mean values for BE/ME, E/P, monthly return and size adjusted 
returns for NMC, ONCE, LEN, PER and REV firm groups as well as all MC firms in the 
aggregate.  Results show that the NMC and ONCE firms are generally similar in earnings, 
returns and size adjusted returns. However, NMC firms have higher BE/ME values. They 
are larger firms as shown in Table 19, and report higher earnings and returns than LEN, 
PER and REV firms.  LEN and PER firms are similar in size and BE/ME values, but LEN 
firms show higher earnings, returns and size adjusted returns than PER firms. The REV 
firms are the smallest in size, BE/ME, earnings and size adjusted return.  The averaged 
monthly return shows that all six groups earn significantly positive monthly raw returns but 
NMC and ONCE groups earn the highest raw returns (1.2%) while PER and REV earn the 
lowest raw returns (0.7%). The bottom row shows that the aggregated MC firm group earns 
0.17% less monthly returns than NMC group. The raw returns show a decreasing trend 
from the ONCE group to the REV group.  Although all of size adjusted returns are 
negative, they display a similar trend to the raw returns.  NMC and ONCE earn the highest 
size adjusted returns while PER and REV earn the lowest. The difference of size adjusted 
returns between NMC and MC is 0.18%, very close to the raw return difference.   
Table 21 shows the differences of raw and size adjusted returns between NMC, 
ONCE and classified MC groups.  There are no significant differences between raw and 
size adjusted returns between the NMC and ONCE firms or between the PER and REV 
firms, but differences between the other groups are significant.  
 
6.2 Risk Adjusted Returns 
Table 22 shows the risk-adjusted returns from the three regression models for the 
five firm groups. The adjusted returns from all three models are significantly positive for 
the NMC and ONCE firms, except for the equally-weighted three-factor adjusted return for 
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Table 20. Mean and  t-stats of Book Equity to Market Equity (BE/ME), Earning to Price (E/P), Monthly Returns (Ret) and Size 
Adjusted Returns (Size Adjusted Ret) for NMC, ONCE, LEN, PER, REV and MC Firms.  
 
NMC represents firms with no mandated contribution. ONCE includes firms that made only one mandated contribution during the 
sample period. LEN, PER and REV are groups identified from factor and cluster analyses. MC represents all firms with a mandated 
contribution during the sample period.  
           BE/ME 
 
                E/P 
 
       Ret (Monthly) 
 
 Size Adjusted Ret 
Firm Groups Mean t-stat Mean t-stat Mean t-stat Mean t-stat 
NMC 0.0698 31.78   0.0026   0.27 0.0118 45.98 -0.0006 -2.52 
ONCE 0.0471 12.17 -0.0036 -0.19 0.0119 21.68 -0.0003 -0.52 
LEN 0.0457 12.24 -0.0317 -2.58 0.0101 24.10 -0.0024 -5.89 
PER 0.0471   6.42 -0.1061 -3.40 0.0069   8.10 -0.0054 -6.58 
REV 0.0112   0.57 -0.1246 -2.37 0.0072   4.38 -0.0069 -4.28 
MC  0.0451 17.08 -0.0395 -4.01 0.0101 32.83 -0.0024 -8.12 
 
 
Table 21. Differences and P-values (in parentheses) of Raw Returns and Size Adjusted Returns for NMC, ONCE, 
LEN, PER, REV and MC Groups.   
 
Raw returns differences are above the diagonal. Size adjusted returns differences are below the diagonal.  F tests don't show unequal 
variances. 
  NMC ONCE LEN PER REV  MC 
NMC   -0.0001 0.0018 0.0050 0.0045 0.0018 
    (0.843) (0.000) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) 
ONCE -0.0003   0.0018 0.0050 0.0046   
  (0.595)   (0.010) (0.000) (0.009)   
LEN 0.0017 0.0020   0.0033 0.0028   
  (0.000) (0.003)   (0.001) (0.100)   
PER 0.0046 0.0053 0.0034  0.0000   
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.982)   
REV 0.0058 0.0069 0.0049 0.0006     
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.753)     
MC  0.0018           
  (0.000)           
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Table 22. Value-Weighted and Equally-Weighted Returns Adjusted by Market, Three-Factors and Four-Factors for NMC, 
ONCE, LEN, PER and REV Firm Groups.   
 
NMC represents firms with no mandated contribution. ONCE includes firms that made only one mandated contribution during the 
sample period. LEN, PER and REV are groups identified from factor and cluster analyses.      
      VWRET           EWRET     
  NMC ONCE LEN PER REV  NMC ONCE LEN PER REV 
              
                Market adjusted Returns 
Mean 0.0052 0.0038
A
 0.0040
 AB
 0.0018
ABC
 -0.0008
ABC
   0.0063 0.0052 0.0037
 AB
 0.0006
ABC
 0.0017
AB
 
  (20.956) (6.992) (9.504) (2.022) (-0.467)  (25.487) (9.553) (8.945) (0.742) (0.959) 
Median 0.0027 0.0017 0.0022 0.0007 -0.0054  0.0037 0.0026 0.0020 -0.0005 -0.0026 
               
                      Three-Factor Adjusted Returns 
Mean 0.0039 0.0045 0.0016
 AB
 -0.0019
 ABC
 -0.0028
ABC
   0.0014 0.0004 -0.0015
 AB
 -0.0061
ABC
 -0.0031
ABd
 
  (15.464) (8.191) (3.779) (-2.199) (-1.549)  (5.575) (0.773) (-3.740) (-7.159) (-1.735) 
Median 0.0013 0.0022 -0.0001 -0.0030 -0.0063  -0.0013 -0.0018 -0.0032 -0.0081 -0.0082 
              
                 Four-Factor Adjusted Returns 
Mean 0.0043 0.0068
A
 0.0016
 AB
 -0.0007
ABC
 -0.0016
AB
   0.0026 0.0023 0.0005
 AB
 -0.0038
ABC
 -0.0006
abd
 
  (17.279) (12.245) (3.861) (-0.824) (-0.886)   (10.428) (4.296) (1.233) (-4.482) (-0.368) 
Median 0.0016 0.0044 -0.0001 -0.0017 -0.0054   -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0011 -0.0058 -0.0041 
 
 
A(a)  indicates the mean is significantly different from NMC firms at 0.01 (0.05) level. 
B(b)  indicates the mean is significantly different from ONCE firms at 0.01 (0.05) level.  
C(c)  indicates the mean is significantly different from LEN firms at 0.01 (0.05) level.  
D(d)  indicates the mean is significantly different from PER firms at 0.01 (0.05) level.
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ONCE firms that is not different from zero. For PER and REV firms, the adjusted returns are either 
significantly negative or not different from zero. The LEN firms show mixed results, positive for 
the market model and the value weighted three-factor model, negative for the equally-weighted 
three-factor model and not different from zero for the four-factor model.  The largest difference in 
value-weighted returns is .84%,  between ONCE and REV firms for the four-factor model, and the 
largest difference in equally-weighted returns is .75%, between NMC and PER for the three-factor 
model. The adjusted returns from the three-factor and four-factor models are all negative for PER 
and REV firms and positive for NMC and ONCE. Although not all risk-adjusted returns of REV are 
significant, we should keep in mind that the REV group has the smallest size. The overall results 
show that NMC and ONCE groups earn positive risk-adjusted returns in most cases, while PER and 
REV groups earns negative or zero risk-adjusted returns in all cases. The differences 
between NMC and ONCE firms on the one hand, and the PER and REV firms, on the 
other, are significant.  
Table 23 reports the cumulated risk adjusted returns one quarter and one year to 
five years after the first MC occurrence. NMC firms are excluded because the first MC date 
is required for this analysis. Since most companies release their 10K three months after the 
fiscal year end, I use three months after the fiscal year end as the starting date to calculate 
accumulated market adjusted returns.   
All risk-adjusted returns show that ONCE firms earn consistent and increasingly 
positive returns that are higher than all other MC firm groups. LEN firms earn increasing 
positive adjusted returns in all cases, except one: the adjusted three-factor equal weighted 
returns are not different from zero.  PER firms earn positive cumulated market adjusted 
returns at year five although returns are lower than those of ONCE and LEN firms. The 
adjusted three-factor or four-factor returns for PER firms are either negative or not 
significantly from zero at year five. REV firm returns are mixed, but not significantly  
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Table 23. Cumulated Returns for ONCE, LEN, PER and REV Firms.  
 
The cumulated returns for six periods are calculated with the fiscal year ending of the first mandatory contribution (MC) as a starting point. Pstq1, Psty1, 
Psty2, Psty3, Psty4 and Psty5 are the cumulated returns of one quarter, one year, two years, three years, four years and five years after the fiscal year ending of 
the first MC.   Value-weighted (VWRET) and equally-weighted (EWRET) returns are adjusted by market, three-factors and four-factors. ONCE includes firms 
that made only one mandated contribution during the sample period. LEN, PER and REV are groups identified form factor and cluster analyses.    
      VWRET        EWRET     
                ONCE                  LEN              PER                REV                ONCE                   LEN    PER                ERV 
  Mean t-stat  Mean t-stat  Mean t-stat  Mean t-stat  Mean t-stat  Mean t-stat  Mean t-stat  Mean t-stat  
                 
Market Adjusted Returns  
Pstq1 0.0503 3.051 0.0461 4.025 0.0530 2.178 -0.0167 -0.319 0.0552 3.367 0.0457 3.986 0.0487 2.028 -0.0150 -0.283 
Psty1 0.0451 1.782 0.0662 3.464 -0.0012 -0.032 0.0255 0.342 0.0634 2.468 0.0638 3.349 -0.0117 -0.310 0.0488 0.639 
Psty2 0.1291 2.980 0.1813 6.000 0.0908 1.526 -0.0393 -0.422 0.1688 3.888 0.1749 5.815 0.0624 1.066 0.0121 0.126 
Psty3 0.2341 4.019 0.2454 6.625 0.1570 2.268 0.2440 1.344 0.3012 4.998 0.2358 6.409 0.1249 1.828 0.2301 1.521 
Psty4 0.3050 3.995 0.2627 5.690 0.1128 1.472 0.0953 0.501 0.4000 5.144 0.2595 5.486 0.1023 1.187 0.2762 1.274 
Psty5 0.3995 3.909 0.3236 5.848 0.2029 2.096 0.1655 0.642 0.5190 4.839 0.3027 5.534 0.1225 1.361 0.4207 1.382 
                   
Three-Factor Adjusted  Returns 
Pstq1 0.0527 3.711 0.0096 0.900 -0.0346 -1.491 0.0239 0.740 0.0225 1.435 -0.0021 -0.193 -0.0241 -1.107 -0.0467 -0.919 
Psty1 0.0535 2.094 0.0017 0.099 -0.0783 -2.170 0.0069 0.100 0.0000 0.000 -0.0214 -1.232 -0.1020 -2.757 -0.0439 -0.642 
Psty2 0.1205 2.969 0.0739 2.680 -0.0299 -0.526 0.0154 0.126 0.0152 0.451 0.0036 0.141 -0.1719 -4.046 -0.1349 -1.747 
Psty3 0.2386 4.031 0.1045 2.936 -0.0641 -1.101 0.1101 0.705 0.0932 1.893 0.0067 0.230 -0.1552 -3.109 0.1571 1.002 
Psty4 0.2494 3.442 0.0964 2.286 -0.0540 -0.732 0.0982 0.507 0.1540 2.476 -0.0155 -0.427 -0.2040 -3.427 0.0827 0.478 
Psty5 0.3402 3.121 0.1019 2.080 -0.1067 -1.601 0.1825 0.783 0.1773 2.229 0.0059 0.146 -0.1775 -2.376 0.1878 0.832 
                   
Four-Factor Adjusted Returns 
Pstq1 0.0572 3.392 0.0238 2.150 0.0199 0.813 -0.0243 -0.480 0.0242 1.544 -0.0025 -0.237 -0.0186 -0.835 -0.0410 -0.795 
Psty1 0.0682 2.716 0.0269 1.478 -0.0397 -1.009 0.0020 0.028 0.0272 1.079 -0.0032 -0.181 -0.0774 -2.045 0.0321 0.393 
Psty2 0.1937 4.304 0.0975 3.445 -0.0232 -0.452 -0.0658 -0.783 0.0630 1.783 0.0597 2.186 -0.1118 -2.487 -0.0762 -0.927 
Psty3 0.3073 5.309 0.1340 3.884 0.0244 0.401 0.2514 1.436 0.1654 3.143 0.0749 2.461 -0.0764 -1.419 0.2784 1.593 
Psty4 0.3918 5.183 0.1153 2.659 -0.0063 -0.084 0.1510 0.787 0.2774 3.982 0.0943 2.342 -0.0951 -1.424 0.2493 1.258 
Psty5 0.4969 4.910 0.1123 2.387 0.0104 0.130 0.2646 1.027 0.3308 3.671 0.1597 3.400 -0.0347 -0.398 0.4359 1.646 
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different from zero. These results corroborate those in Table 22. ONCE and LEN firms 
earn higher cumulated returns than PER and REV firms. The number of MC years is the 
highest for PER firms, 8.7 years on average. The consistent negative signs of thee-factor 
and four-factor adjusted returns for PER firms show that the market responds negatively 
to firms with more MC years.  In contrast, the more erratic MC pattern for REV firms is 
probably responsible for the mixed positive and negative returns that these firms exhibit.     
 
6.3 Earnings Surprises and Market Reactions  
When firms make mandated contributions, their cash flow and earnings will be 
affected and consequently, the impact on financial statements, if observed by investors, 
will be reflected in market returns. Due to the complexity of pension accounting, the 
market may not be able to comprehend pension costs completely or immediately.  For 
example, firms sponsoring DB plans do not record the cash contribution to the pension 
plan as an expense, instead treating the net periodic pension cost (NPPC) as an expense in 
its income statement. The NPPC equals the annual accrued costs of the pension plan 
minus the expected return on plan assets.  In addition, sponsoring firms only disclose the 
economic value of pension plans in footnotes when releasing financial statements. Is the 
market surprised when the implications of the MC requirement begin to register in future 
firm performance? In this section, I investigate market reactions to earnings surprises of 
MC firms. I look at standardized unexpected earnings, three days cumulated returns, and 
risk adjusted returns around the announcement from one quarter, and one year to five 
years after the first MC occurrence. Again, NMC firms are excluded because the first MC 
occurrence date is required for this analysis. 
If firms make MC payments, their cash flow and earnings are likely to be 
affected. If the market does not fully understand the implications of current MC payments 
for future earnings, adverse changes in future earnings will come as a surprise. In this 
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sub-section, I measure market reactions around MC firms’ earning announcements. I use 
standardized unexpected earnings to capture earnings surprises, and four different 
measures of market reactions. Standardized unexpected earnings (SUE) is defined as 
follows: 
SUEit = (eit - eit-4) / σit   (9) 
Where eit is quarterly earnings in quarter t, eit-4 is quarterly earnings 4 quarters before t, 
and σit is stand deviation of unexpected earnings over the preceding 8 quarters.   
The four measures of market reactions are as follows: 
i) Three days’ accumulated returns around the earnings announcement  
  CRit =  Σ rij      (10) 
Where i represents stock i, t represents period, and j is from -1 day to 1 day with zero 
being the earnings announcement date.  
ii) Three days’ accumulated market-adjusted returns centered around the earnings 
announcement 
MKTACRit =  Σ (rij - bi EXMt)   (11) 
iii) Three days’ accumulated three-factor model adjusted returns centered around the 
earnings announcement 
3FACRit =  Σ (rij - bi EXMt - hi HMLt - si SMBt )  (12) 
iv) Three days’ accumulated four-factor model adjusted returns centered around the 
earnings announcement 
4FACRit =  Σ (rij - bi EXMt - hi HMLt - si SMBt - miUMDt)  (13) 
Table 24 reports the measured surprises and shows the means of SUE, CR and 
cumulated announcement returns adjusted for risk. SUE means, measuring expectations 
over a longer period than the 3-day window used for returns, show that for ONCE firms, 
there is no earnings surprise for the first quarter, but there are positive surprises for years 
1 to 3. For LEN and PER firms there is a negative earnings surprise in the first quarter, 
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Table 24.  Unexpected Earnings and Market Reactions.  
 
Standardized Unexpected Earnings (SUE), Three Days (-1, 0, 1) Cumulated Returns and Risk Adjusted 
Returns around Quarterly Announcement Date.  With the fiscal quarter ending before the first mandated 
contribution occurrence as a starting point, each period measure is calculated by summing the quarterly 
surprises. VW (EW) represents value (equally) weighted returns. CR is cumulated raw return for three days 
around the earnings announcement, MKTACR is the market adjusted return over the three days around the 
earnings announcement, 3FACR (4FACR) is the three-factor (four-factor) adjusted return in the three days 
around the earnings announcement. 1q is the first quarter announcement return, 1y, 2y, 3y, 4y and 5y are the 
summarized announcement period returns.  ONCE includes firms that made only one mandated contribution 
during the sample period . LEN, PER and REV are groups identified from factor and cluster analysis. 
 
ONCE LEN PER REV  ONCE LEN PER REV 
   SUE         CR     
1q 0.0080 -0.2731* -0.3712** -0.2497  0.0129*** 0.0162*** 0.0055 -0.0098 
1y 1.2235*** 0.1201 0.0535 1.5012  0.0186** 0.0306*** - 0.0141 0.0344 
2y 0.6050** 1.1633*** -0.0627 0.8536  0.0051 0.0358*** 0.0192* 0.0458** 
3y 0.5758* 1.1852*** 0.3947 0.2907  0.0164* 0.0275*** 0.0331* 0.0779 
4y 0.2459 0.5142 -0.1459 0.3724  0.0219*** 0.0417*** 0.0350* 0.0177 
5y 0.2656 0.3064 0.5820 1.3313  0.0119 0.0354*** 0.0188 -0.0164 
          
  VW: MKTACR    EW: MKTACR  
1q -0.0174** -0.0044 -0.0239** -0.0063  -0.0129* -0.0056 -0.0348*** -0.0057 
1y -0.0526*** -0.0753*** -0.0784*** 0.0273  -0.0450*** -0.0806*** -0.1125*** 0.0165 
2y -0.0320** -0.0197 -0.0378* -0.0675  -0.0256* -0.0242 -0.0615** -0.0744 
3y -0.0807*** -0.0276 -0.0606** -0.0219  -0.0663**-   -0.0663*** -0.0360 -0.0822** -0.0494** 
4y -0.0693*** -0.0609*** -0.0422 -0.1028***  -0.0743*** -0.0692*** -0.1132*** -0.1157** 
5y -0.0142 -0.0379* -0.0424 0.0181  -0.0048 -0.0379 -0.0776** 0.0443 
          
  VW: 3FACR    EW: 3FACR   
1q -0.0152* -0.0198** -0.0322* -0.0462  -0.0366*** -0.0416*** -0.0773*** -0.0447 
1y -0.0637*** -0.1040*** -0.1208*** 0.0055  -0.0464*** -0.0906*** -0.1173*** 0.0811* 
2y -0.0502*** -0.0643*** -0.0939*** -0.0955**  -0.0599*** -0.0451** -0.1165*** -0.0744 
3y -0.0827*** -0.0653*** -0.0943*** -0.0545**  -0.0483*** -0.0393** -0.1052*** -0.0710 
4y -0.1056*** -0.1037*** -0.1005*** -0.1436**  -0.0331* -0.0316 -0.0183 -0.1438* 
5y -0.0362 -0.0419* -0.0400 -0.0512  -0.0358 -0.0621*** -0.0814** 0.0366 
          
  VW: 4FACR    EW: 4FACR   
1q -0.0134 -0.0236*** -0.0293* -0.0466  -0.0256*** -0.0408*** -0.0717*** -0.0413 
1y -0.0421*** -0.1121*** -0.1146*** 0.0315  -0.0346** -0.0978*** -0.1096*** 0.0935** 
2y -0.0381** -0.0693*** -0.0920*** -0.0823  -0.0293** -0.0480*** -0.1129*** -0.0900 
3y -0.0830*** -0.0679*** -0.0961*** -0.0536*  -0.0222 -0.0375** -0.0964*** -0.0582 
4y -0.0996*** -0.1018*** -0.1058*** -0.1156*  -0.0223 -0.0369* -0.0048 -0.1404** 
5y -0.0480* -0.0471** -0.0343 -0.0491  -0.0122 -0.0509** -0.0750** 0.0418 
 
*, **, *** represent significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively.  
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and no earnings surprise for the first year. LEN firms show positive earnings surprise in 
years 2 and 3, while PER firms show no significant earnings surprise. First quarter 
earnings surprise for REV firms is negative, but the following years show no significant 
earnings surprise.  Most of the cumulated announcement returns (CRs) for ONCE and all 
CRs for LEN are positive, while those for PER firms are positive (marginally significant) 
from year 2 to 4. Cumulated returns for REV firms are positive only in year 2.  Once 
again, ONCE and LEN show higher CR more frequently than PER and REV firms.  After 
adjusting for market risk, almost all significant returns around announcements are 
negative. The three-factor and four-factor CRs show similar results. While it is hard to 
say that negative risk adjusted returns are associated with negative earning news given 
the results for SUE, the fact that all risk- adjusted returns for ONCE and LEN are higher 
than for PER and REV firms confirms that the market reacts more negatively to PER and 
REV firms’ earnings announcements following an MC occurrence than to those of ONCE 
and LEN firms.   
 
6.4 Analyst Forecasts 
Panel A of Table 25 reports 20 quarters of analyst forecasts and revisions for the 
four MC firm groups after the first MC occurrence. I only report the results of mean 
forecasts and revisions because the results of median forecasts and revisions are 
essentially the same.  The averaged quarterly forecasts show that analysts take MC into 
consideration and forecast ONCE and LEN firms correctly. However, they do not 
differentiate between PER firms and ONCE and LEN firms. As a result, they make large 
forecast errors (FE) for PER firms. Lower forecasts for REV firms show that analysts are 
able to identify these MC firms and forecast them differently. This argument is supported 
by the small and insignificant forecast error for REV firms. HLDIF, the difference 
between the highest and lowest forecast estimates scaled by the preceding month’s price, 
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Table 25. Analyst Quarterly Forecasts and Revisions for ONCE, LEN, PER and REV 
Firms.   
 
Forecast is the average of 20 quarterly earnings forecasts starting after the firm’s first MC 
occurrence. FE is the forecasted earnings mean minus actual earnings per share scaled by the 
price of the preceding month multiplied by 100.  HLDIF is the highest forecast minus lowest 
forecast in the quarter scaled by the price of the preceding month. MMDIF is the forecasted mean 
minus median in the quarter scaled by the price of the preceding month.  AbsFE is the absolute 
value of FE. NRev is the number of analysts who made revisions during the forecast quarter. 
Followings is the number of analysts who have at least one forecast during the quarter.  NRev% is 
the ratio of NRev to Followings. REV is the mean of quarterly revisions. ABSREV is the mean of 
the absolute value of quarterly revisions. NegRev% is the proportion of negative revisions and 
PosRev% is the proportion of positive revisions. ONCE includes firms that made only one 
mandated contribution during the sample period. LEN, PER and REV are groups identified from 
factor and cluster analysis.  All estimates are means with t values in parentheses.  
  
Panel A. Analyst Forecasts. 
 MC Firms Mean  FE(Mean) HLDIF MMDIF AbsFE  
ONCE 0.328 -0.007 0.231 0.002 0.283 
 (55.610) (-0.431) (32.470) (2.055) (18.436) 
      
LEN 0.320 0.001 0.260 0.002 0.312 
 (77.039) (0.112) (45.315) (2.671) (26.549) 
      
PER 0.312 0.092 0.290 0.002 0.358 
 (35.543) (2.985) (23.828) (1.665) (12.371) 
      
REV 0.177 -0.020 0.341 0.004 0.920 
  (10.156) (-0.162) (10.407) (1.279) (8.536) 
 
 
Panel B. Analyst Revisions 
  NRev Followings NRev% MeanRev AbsRev NegRev% PosRev% 
ONCE 3.757 8.089 0.483 -0.101 0.234 0.568 0.432 
 (34.306) (59.691) (18.947) (-10.469) (26.419)     
        
LEN 3.208 6.636 0.502 -0.124 0.281 0.649 0.371 
 (45.557) (85.022) (54.812) (-15.718) (39.528)     
        
PER 2.901 6.710 0.467 -0.174 0.301 0.699 0.302 
 (26.587) (45.928) (75.967) (-11.130) (21.364)     
        
REV 3.518 6.044 0.573 -0.121 0.528 0.638 0.364 
  (11.591) (18.947) (39.588) (-1.933) (9.933)     
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measures the dispersion among the forecasts. That HLDIF increases from ONCE to REV 
firms indicates there is an increasing disagreement among analysts as we move from 
ONCE to REV firms. REV firms with the lowest forecast mean display the largest 
dispersion among analysts’ forecasts, indicating the lack of consensus among analysts on 
these firms. MMDIF, the difference between the mean and median forecast scaled by the 
preceding month’s price, measures the skewness of the forecast. Positive values indicate 
skewness to the left and negative values indicate skewness to the right. All MMDIF 
means are positive, indicating that forecasts are skewed to the left, i.e., there are more 
low forecast estimates among analysts. The absolute forecast error (AbsFE) is the 
magnitude of the forecast error regardless of direction and a measure of analyst forecast 
accuracy. Results clearly indicate that forecast accuracy decreases from ONCE to REV 
firms, providing evidence that the complexity of MC affects analyst forecast accuracy.  
For REV firms, AbsFE is about three times as high as for ONCE and LEN firms, 
suggesting that these firms are more difficult to forecast,  the unbiased forecast mean 
being due to the cancelation of positive and negative forecasts. The overall evidence 
shows that analysts forecast ONCE and LEN firms more accurately than PER and REV 
firms.   
Panel B of Table 25 reports analysts’ quarterly revisions averaged over twenty 
quarters after the first MC occurrence. Of all four groups, ONCE firms have the largest 
average number of revisions and the greatest analyst following. But in terms of number 
of revision per analyst, REV firms have the highest, indicating that analyst in this firm 
group have the most frequent revisions. Mean revisions are all negative, suggesting that 
analysts initially overestimate earning. They subsequently revise their estimate 
downwards. This is supported by the additional evidence shown in the last two columns 
of Panel B, indicating that the proportion of negative revisions (NegRev%) is higher than 
that of positive revisions for all MC firm groups.  The mean revision for PER firms is  
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larger than for ONCE, LEN and REV firms, supporting the findings in Panel A that 
analyst forecasts for PER firms are largely overestimated.  The absolute values of 
revisions (AbsRev) increase from ONCE to REV firms, indicating that the new 
information becomes more relevant to analysts for more severely impacted MC firms. 
Results from Panels A and B suggest that MC occurrences do affect analyst forecasts, 
and the accuracy of the forecasts depends on the complexity and severity of firms’ MC 
patterns.   
Figures 7 and 8 depict the forecast errors and revisions from the first quarter to 
the 20
th
  quarter after the first MC occurrence for the four MC firm groups. The overall 
trend shows that the forecast errors for ONCE and LEN firms are smaller and more 
stable, those for PER firms are less stable and those for REV firms are least stable and 
most volatile, with large ups and downs.  This evidence once again suggests that the level 
and complexity of firm’s MC requirements impact analysts forecasts and REV firms are 
the most difficult to forecast.    
 
 6.5 Institutional Investors 
Because institutional investors hold large volume of stocks and are more 
sophisticated, their moves are likely to be more prudent and shrewd.  In this section, I 
examine the responses of institutional investors to different MC patterns. Do institutional 
investors recognize the implications of MC requirements and take these into 
consideration when making their portfolio decisions? If they do, when do they recognize 
these implications? Can they distinguish between different MC patterns among firms?  
From institutional holdings data (Thomson Financial 13-f Spectrum database), I 
calculate percent of institutional holdings (PIH) based on number of shares held by 
institutional investors and total number of shares outstanding. Since the data contains 
only the end-of-calendar-quarter holdings, PIH is calculated quarterly. Based on the  
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Figure 7. Analyst Quarterly Forecasted Errors For ONCE, LEN, PER and REV Firms from Quarter 0 to 
20 after the First MC.   
 
Forecast error is defined as the difference between forecasted mean and quarterly earnings scaled by the stock 
price of previous month and then multiplied by 100. ONCE includes firms that made mandatory contribution 
once. LEN, PER, REV are firm groups from factor and cluster analyses.  
 
 
 
Figure 8. Analyst Quarterly Revisions for ONCE, LEN, PER and REV Firms from Quarter 0 to 20 after 
the First MC.   
 
Forecast revision is defined as the difference between two consecutive forecasts of the same analyst in the 
quarter, averaged over all analysts. ONCE includes firms that made mandatory contribution once. LEN, PER, 
REV are firm groups from factor and cluster analyses.   
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classifications of Bushee (1998) and Abarbanell, Bushee, and Raedy (2003), I group 
investors into three investment classes: dedicated (DED), quasi-indexers (QIX) and 
transient (TRA) and four investment styles: large value (LGA), large growth (LGR), 
small value (SVA) and small growth (SGR) to examine whether the institutional holdings 
among MC firm groups are affected by investment classes and styles.  
Panel A of Table 26 presents PIH and change in PIH data for NMC firms and four 
MC firm groups for the entire sample period. For the ONCE group and the three 
classified MC groups, I use data after the firm’s first MC occurrence.  Since firms in 
NMC group don’t have a MC date, I used all the data to compare NMC and MC firms.  
The results of PIH in Panel A show that institutional investors, on average, don’t hold 
fewer shares in MC firms than in NMC firms. Within MC groups, institutional holdings 
in the REV firm group drop 16.2% to 32.7%, and holdings in the PER firm group drop 
1.4% to 48.5%. Holdings in the ONCE and LEN groups are slightly higher than holdings 
in MC firms in the aggregate.  
Among the three investment classes, both quasi-indexer and transient investors 
invest the most shares in ONCE firms and the least in REV firms.  Quasi-indexer 
investors have about the same holdings in ONCE, LEN and PER firms and substantially 
lower holdings in REV firms. Transient investor holdings decrease monotonically as we 
move from ONCE to REV firms. The holdings of dedicated investors show a different 
pattern. These investors have higher holdings in LEN and PER firms than in ONCE and 
REV firms.  For the four investment styles, the large value and large growth investors 
invest the most in ONCE firms and the least in REV firms. However, like the quasi-index 
investors, their holdings among the ONCE, LEN and PER firm groups don’t vary much. 
Small value investors show decreasing holdings from ONCE to REV firms although the 
holdings in ONCE and LEN firms are very close.  Small growth investors who are 
willing to bear higher risks to seek short term gains don’t hold less in REV firms. Large  
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Table 26. Percent of Institutional Holdings (PIH) and Changes in Percent of Institutional Holdings 
(CPIH) for NMC, ONCE, LEN, PER, ERV and MC Firms by the Investment Classe and Style.  
 
NMC consists of  firms that make no mandated contributions during the sample period. ONCE consists of  
the firms that make only one mandated contribution during the sample period. LEN, PER, REV are groups 
identified from factor and cluster analysis. The MC group represents all mandated contribution firms. The 
investement class and style are defined in Table 15.  Data used in NMC and MC groups are from 1991 to 
2005. For ONCE, LEN and PER and REV firm groups, data are after the first MC occurrence during the 
period 1991 to 2005.  
 
Panel A. PIH. 
   NMC MC  ONCE LEN PER REV 
  DED 0.1017 0.1093  0.0921 0.1273 0.1285 0.1004 
Class QIX 0.2571 0.2592  0.2797 0.2713 0.2645 0.1625 
  TRA 0.1049 0.1080  0.1302 0.1040 0.0923 0.0702 
 LVA 0.1515 0.1427  0.1727 0.1557 0.1580 0.0847 
Style LGR 0.1228 0.1224  0.1332 0.1330 0.1241 0.0681 
 SVG 0.0967 0.1021  0.0970 0.0954 0.0858 0.0734 
  SGR 0.0874 0.1022  0.0991 0.1174 0.1174 0.1010 
  Total 0.4885 0.4991  0.5019 0.5014 0.4853 0.3272 
         
Panel B. CPIH.       
  DED 0.0031 0.0038  0.0026 0.0041 0.0052 0.0045 
Class QIX 0.0070 0.0076  0.0086 0.0086 0.0076 0.0093 
  TRA 0.0077 0.0085  0.0096 0.0091 0.0095 0.0065 
 LVA 0.0035 0.0035  0.0041 0.0042 0.0039 0.0037 
Style LGR 0.0033 0.0040  0.0034 0.0034 0.0045 0.0024 
 SVG 0.0050 0.0053  0.0058 0.0054 0.0046 0.0058 
 SGR 0.0060 0.0073  0.0074 0.0088 0.0093 0.0078 
  Total 0.0193 0.0222  0.0208 0.0218 0.0224 0.0197 
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investors and quasi-index investors show similar patterns, investing less in REV firms 
and about the same in ONCE, LEN and PER firms, indicating that these institutional 
investors can distinguish between REV firms and the rest of MC firms. Small value and 
transient investor holdings decrease monotonically from ONCE to REV firms, although 
differences in holdings among the four MC firm groups are small. Neither the small 
growth nor the dedicated investors seem to view REV firms differently from other MC 
firms, although their holdings in LEN and PER firms are slightly higher.    
Panel B of Table 26 shows changes in PIH.  Overall changes show that 
institutional investors engage in more trading activities in MC firms than in NMC firms. 
Transient investors, with the lowest holdings among the investor classes, trade most 
frequently, consistent with their short-term strategy. Small investors, with fewer holdings 
than large investors, trade more frequently than the large investors. Further, small growth 
investors trade more frequently than small value investors. Within the four group 
classifications, dedicated investors trade more in PER and REV firms than in ONCE and 
LEN firms. Changes in the holdings of other investors don’t exhibit a clear pattern.   
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CHAPTER 7 
ROBUSTNESS ANALYSES 
 
7.1 Selection Bias 
 The data in Table 3 show a relatively high proportion of MC firms are in the 
Transportation, Metal and Machinery industries. This raises concerns that the grouping 
strategy used in this study might have resulted in selection biases, reflecting the special 
characteristics of some industries. For example, instances of MC for firms in the 
machinery industry during a particular period could result from cyclical effects affecting 
the industry during that period. There could be unobserved variables that are correlated 
both with MC and industry characteristics, affecting inferences drawn from analyses 
based on my grouping strategy.  
 To test the robustness of my findings I employ the Heckman two-stage model. 
The first stage model is a logit model utilizing all available data, including both MC and 
NMC firms. The second stage is a probit model focusing only on MC firms (a subset of 
the first stage estimation sample). The selection control variable constructed from the 
predicted values obtained in the first stage is included as a regressor in the second stage 
model (Heckman, 1997). The main focus of this analysis is not the selection bias per se, 
but whether the characteristics of MC groups documented in previous sections still hold 
after taking possible selection bias into consideration.  
In the second stage, I first model the six MCX firm groups that make consecutive 
mandatory contributions for periods ranging from one year (MC1) to six or more years 
(MC6). Columns 2 and 3 in Table 27 report the results of the two stage estimations.   
Column 2 shows the results of the first stage logit analysis that models t he likelihood of a 
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Table  27. Determinants of Mandatory Contribution (MC) by Controlling for 
Sample Selection Bias. 
 
Heckman’s two-stage model is applied. The first stage equation models the likelihood that 
a firm makes mandatory contribution (MC) as a function of pension plan characteristics. 
The second stage
1
 equation uses the six consecutive MC firm groups and models the 
likelihood that a firm makes longer consecutive MC as a function of pension plan 
characteristics and the conditional expectation of unobservable factors determined based 
on the outputs of the first stage equation.  The six firm groups are MC1 to MC6 with MC1 
consisting of firms with one MC year, MC2, MC3, MC4, MC5 and MC6 consisting of 
firms with two, three, four, five and six (or more) consecutive MC years, respectively.  
The second stage
2
 equation uses the ONCE, LEN, PER and REV MC group classifications 
and models the likelihood that a firm becomes a more severely impacted MC firm as a 
function of pension plan characteristics and the conditional expectation of unobservable 
factors determined based on the outputs of the first stage equation.  ONCE includes firms 
that made only one mandated contribution during the sample period. LEN, PER and REV 
are groups identified from factor and cluster analyses. 
  First stage   Second Stage
1
 Second Stage
2
 
 logit model  probit model probit model 
 MC=1  Prob(lower order)   Prob(lower order)   
Intercept -4.2121***   -1.3562***  -0.8883***  
Intercept2     0.2597***    1.1578***  
Intercept3     0.6334***    2.9545***  
Intercept4     0.0097***    
Intercept5     1.5202***    
GWAY 
 -
0.0176***   -0.0071***  -0.0207***  
DRC 6.0509***     0.7936***    0.5645***  
CurAst -1.4537***    -0.4693  -0.6309***  
CurLia 1.3328***     0.5369*    0.5805***  
NewLia  0.8832***     0.1617    0.0808  
Selection Correction      0.2069***    0.1508***  
       
Control variables        
Industry     Yes       yes       yes  
Year     Yes        yes        yes   
 
1
  Probit equation models the lower order of the six consecutive MC groups, with MC6 (order 1), MC5 
(order 2), MC4 (order 3), MC3 (order 4), MC2 (order 5), MC1 (order 6). 
2
  Probit  equation models the lower order of the four MC groups, with REV (order 1), PER (order 2), 
LEV (order 3), ONCE (order 4). 
*, **, *** represent significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively.  
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 firm being an MC firm. As GWAY (Gateway percent) and CurAst (current fund asset) 
increase, the likelihood of a firm being an MC firm decreases. On the other hand, as DRC 
(deficit reduction contribution), CurLia (fund current liability) and NewLia (fund new 
liability amount) increase, the likelihood of a firm being an MC firm increases.  
Column 3 presents the results of the probit model with “selection control” added 
as an extra regressor. Since lower order values represents higher number of consecutive 
MC years, the model estimates the probability of a firm making more consecutive years 
of mandatory contribution, given that it is an MC firm. The selection control variable is 
significant, indicating the selection control is necessary to reduce selection bias. The 
coefficients show that the likelihood of a firm making more consecutive years of 
mandatory contribution increases as GWAY decreases, and as DRC and CurLia increase. 
Neither CurAst nor NewLia are significant.  Since I model the groups with the ordinal 
probit model, the intercepts are the cutoff points of the cumulated distribution function 
(CDF), and measure the likelihood of the group(s) being above specific cutoff points. For 
example, INTERCEPT measures the likelihood of an MC6 versus an MC1 to MC5 
classification, when other variables are held constant; INTERCEPT2 measures the 
likelihood of a classification above the MC4 level, etc.  All intercepts are significant, 
providing some evidence about the reliability of the estimated cutoff points. 
Using a similar approach, I then model the likelihood of MC firms being 
classified as ONCE firms (with only one MC year) or one of the three groups identified 
by factor and cluster analyses (LEN, PER and REV). Column 4 in Table 27 reports the 
results of this second stage estimation. I define the order values 4, 3, 2 and 1 
corresponding to  ONCE, LEN, PER and REV firms. Then I model the probability of a 
firm falling to a lower level group after inclusion of the selection control variable. Except 
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for NewLia, all coefficients are significant in the expected direction, revealing a strong 
relation between the likelihood of a firm falling to a lower level group and GWAY, DRC, 
CurAst and CurLia. The likelihood increases as DRC and CurLia decrease and as GWAY 
and CurAst increase. The insignificance of NewLia is probably because it is a major 
component of DRC. The significance of selection control variable indicates the 
importance of its inclusion in the second stage estimation.  All intercepts are significant, 
indicating that the cutoffs between the various classifications are significantly 
demarcated, after the inclusion of the section control variable.  
Both models show that after controlling sample selection bias,  the likelihood of a 
firm falling into one of the six MCX groups (from MC1 to MC6) or along the ONCE, 
LEN, PER, REV spectrum  is associated with GATEWAY, DRC, CurAst and CurLia, 
supporting the belief that the constructed MC groups reflect differences in pension 
funding status reasonably well.   
 
7.2  Industry Clusters 
It could be argued that even if differences among the ONCE, LEN, PER and REV 
firm groups reflect differences in the pension funding status, the differences in adjusted 
returns among these groups may be due to clustered industry effects because models (1), 
(2) and (3) don’t adjust for an industry effect.  Since all three models include the market 
beta  some of the industry effect is likely controlled for.  Nevertheless, to test the 
robustness of my results, I perform regression analysis to examine the group effects on 
the risk-adjusted returns after controlling for the industry effect. I use the General Linear 
Model (GLM) because the Group and Industry regressors are discrete and their 
coefficient matrix does not have full rank.  
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Table 28 reports results of the risk-adjusted returns from the three regression 
models for the six MCX firm groups by controlling for any industry effect. Panel A 
shows the univariate analysis results. The industry variable is not significant for any  risk-
adjusted returns. The group effect is weak for the market adjusted returns, not significant 
for VWRET, and only marginally significant for the EWRET. But for the three-factor 
and four-factor adjusted returns, group effects are all significant with p-value less than 
0.01.  The industry effect is not significant in any model. The interaction between group 
and industry is not significant either.  Panel B shows the p-values of the contrasts 
between the six groups. The three-factor and four-factor adjusted returns exhibit more 
differences than the market-adjusted returns. As the gap between the number of MC years 
increases, the differences between the two corresponding groups become more 
pronounced.   The evidence indicates that the differences in risk-adjusted returns across 
MC groups are not affected by industry affiliation. 
Table 29 reports results of the risk-adjusted returns from the three regression 
models for NMC, ONCE, LEN, PER and REV MC firm groups after controlling for any 
industry effect. Panel A shows a significant industry effect, possibly because NMC firms 
are included. However, all risk-adjusted returns are significant different among groups 
after controlling for the industry effect. Except for the market-adjusted model using 
VWRET, there is no interaction between group and industry, showing that return 
differences among the groups are not affected by industry.    
Panel B shows the p-values of contrasts between the five MC firm groups. 
Differences among these five groups are more pronounced than among the six MCX 
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Table 28. Analyses of Value-Weighted and Equally-Weighted Returns (VWRET and EWRET) Adjusted for Risk Using 
Three Regression Models for Six Consecutive Mandatory Contribution (MC) Firm Groups after Controlling for the 
Industry Effect.   
 
The six firm groups are MC1 to MC6 with MC1 consisting of firms with one MC year, MC2, MC3, MC4, MC5 and MC6 
consisting of firms with two, three, four, five and six (or more) consecutive MC years, respectively.  The dependent variables 
are Value-Weighted (VWRET) and Equally-Weighted (EWRET) returns adjusted for risk using three regression models.  The 
independent variables are Group, Industry and the interaction of the two.  
 
Panel A. Univariate Analyses by General Linear Model (GLM).   
      VWRET         EWRET     
       
     Market Adjusted Returns   
Source DF SS MS F-statistic  P-value  SS MS F-statistic  P-value 
group 5 0.116 0.023 1.61 0.154   0.145 0.029 2.02 0.073 
industry 18 0.290 0.016 1.12 0.329  0.286 0.016 1.11 0.339 
group*industry 76 0.985 0.013 0.90 0.724  0.998 0.013 0.91 0.692 
       
     Three-Factor Adjusted Returns   
group 5 0.279 0.056 3.831 0.002  0.291 0.058 4.134 0.001 
industry 18 0.301 0.017 1.149 0.295  0.261 0.014 1.029 0.422 
group*industry 76 0.942 0.012 0.852 0.818  0.887 0.012 0.829 0.856 
       
     Four-Factor Adjusted Returns   
group 5 0.440 0.088 6.056 0.000  0.290 0.058 4.153 0.001 
industry 18 0.300 0.017 1.149 0.296  0.256 0.014 1.018 0.435 
group*industry 76 0.940 0.012 0.852 0.818   0.866 0.011 0.815 0.878 
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Table 28. (Continued) 
 
Panel B. P-values of the Contrast tests between the Six Consecutive MC Firm Groups by GLM.   The cell that intersects the 
row group and column group represents the contrast test between the two groups.  
      VWRET           EWRET     
         
     Market Adjusted Returns     
      MC2 MC3 MC4 MC5 MC6   MC2 MC3 MC4 MC5 MC6  
MC1 0.506 0.708 0.074 0.053 0.316   0.909 0.970 0.463 0.5136 0.0176 
MC2  0.889 0.244 0.146 0.158     0.908 0.456 0.4949 0.0438 
MC3   0.252 0.153 0.282     0.576 0.5899 0.0669 
MC4    0.656 0.020      0.9516 0.0152 
MC5     0.016      0.0373 
        
    Three-Factor Adjusted Returns    
MC1 0.236 0.003 0.669 0.496 0.008  0.983 0.311 0.476 0.222 0.001 
MC2  0.076 0.227 0.187 0.159   0.374 0.508 0.243 0.003 
MC3   0.010 0.013 0.640    0.179 0.087 0.080 
MC4    0.771 0.018     0.575 0.001 
MC5     0.023      0.001 
        
    Four-Factor Adjusted Returns    
MC1 0.003 0.000 0.465 0.958 0.001  0.661 0.265 0.246 0.090 0.002 
MC2  0.200 0.174 0.105 0.491   0.495 0.175 0.064 0.015 
MC3   0.022 0.016 0.537    0.075 0.029 0.152 
MC4    0.652 0.058     0.507 0.001 
MC5         0.039           0.000 
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Table 29. Analyses of Value-Weighted and Equally-Weighted returns (VWRET and EWRET) Adjusted for Risk 
Using Three Regression Models for NMC, ONCE, LEN, PER, REV Firm Groups after Controlling for the Industry 
Effect.  
 
NMC represents firms with no mandated contribution. ONCE includes firms that made only one mandated contribution 
during the sample period. LEN, PER and REV are groups identified from factor and cluster analyses. Dependent variables 
are Value-Weighted and Equally-Weighted returns (EWRET) adjusted for risk using three regression models.  The 
independent variables are Group, Industry and the interaction of the two.    
 
Panel A. Panel A. Univariate Analyses by General Linear Model (GLM).   
      VWRET         EWRET     
     Market Adjusted Returns   
Source DF SS MS F-statistic P-value  SS MS F-statistic  P-value 
group 4 0.261 0.065 7.68 0.000  0.318 0.080 6.09 0.000 
industry 18 1.797 0.100 11.77 0.000  1.656 0.092 7.04 0.000 
group*industry 69 1.438 0.021 2.46 0.000  0.970 0.014 1.08 0.310 
           
     Three Factor Adjusted Returns   
group 4 0.396 0.099 7.51 0.000  0.613 0.153 12.01 0.000 
industry 18 1.660 0.092 7.01 0.000  1.558 0.087 6.79 0.000 
group*industry 69 0.962 0.014 1.06 0.344  0.924 0.013 1.05 0.363 
           
     Four Factor Adjusted Returns   
group 4 0.653 0.163 12.44 0.000  0.391 0.098 7.69 0.000 
industry 18 1.648 0.092 6.97 0.000  1.535 0.085 6.72 0.000 
group*industry 69 0.949 0.014 1.05 0.371  0.909 0.013 1.04 0.394 
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Table 29. (Continued) 
 
Panel B. P-values of the Contrast Tests between Various MC Firm Groups by GLM.   The cell that intersects the 
row group and column group represents the contrast test between the two groups.  
    VWRET         EWRET     
     Market Adjusted Returns     
 ONCE LEN PER  REV   ONCE LEN PER  REV  
NMC 0.366 0.772 0.001 0.060  0.976 0.082 0.000 0.091 
ONCE   0.536 0.011 0.180   0.180 0.000 0.105 
LEN   0.002 0.085    0.003 0.296 
PER    0.494     0.509 
          
     Three Factor Adjusted Returns   
NMC 0.018 0.225 0.000 0.003  0.806 0.003 0.000 0.032 
ONCE  0.002 0.000 0.000   0.041 0.000 0.052 
LEN   0.000 0.012    0.000 0.294 
PER    0.762     0.064 
          
     Four Factor Adjusted Returns   
NMC 0.000 0.029 0.000 0.006  0.329 0.244 0.000 0.323 
ONCE  0.000 0.000 0.000   0.079 0.000 0.180 
LEN   0.016 0.052    0.000 0.576 
PER       0.657         0.040 
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groups (Panel B, Table 28). Differences in returns between two groups tend to increase 
with their distance from each other along the funding shortfall spectrum. The severity of 
the MC effect on the risk-adjusted returns increases from ONCE to LEN, PER and REV 
firms. Once again, the three-factor and four-factor adjusted returns exhibit more 
differences across groups than the market-adjusted returns. The evidence suggests that 
NMC and ONCE firms are different from PER and REV firms after controlling for the 
industry effect. 
Overall, the above analyses suggest that the results documented in chapters 5 and 
6 hold after controlling for industry effects, alleviating concerns that industry clustering 
might limit the ability to draw reliable inferences from prior results.  
 
7.3  Changes in MC Requirement Rule 
ERISA changed the MC rule in 1995, lowering the underfunding threshold from 
100% to 80%-90%. The different thresholds in the two periods might affect stock return 
results. To address this concern, I perform two tests. In the first test, I define a binary 
variable YG (year group) which takes value 1 if an observation is before year 1995 and 
value 0 otherwise and then repeat the analyses as shown in section 7.2 with the YG 
variable added to the GLM model. The results are essentially the same as shown in Table 
28 and 29 with contrast tests are almost identical
8
, suggesting that the change of MC 
requirement doesn’t drive the empirical results.   
In the second test, I divide the sample into two periods, the first spanning 1991 to 
1994, and the second spanning 1995-2005, and then compute the risk-adjusted returns for 
the NMC, ONE, LEN, PER, REV firm groups to examine whether the observed 
                                              
8
 The results are not tabulated.  
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differences among the five firm groups documented in Chapter 4 still hold.  The 
drawback for this test is that the samples become smaller and hence the predictive power 
is reduced, especially for the 1991 to 1994 period, and for REV firm group which has the 
least number of firms.
9
 Nonetheless, this analysis could be useful as a validity test , check 
whether the results derived from the whole period are consistent in the two period sub-
samples
10
.   
Table 30 shows the results of these analyses.
11
 Panel A reports the risk-adjusted 
monthly returns for the five firm groups from the three models for the first period (1991 
to 1994). REV firms earn significantly positive market-adjusted returns, but returns are 
not significantly different from zero for the three-factor and four-factor models.  For both 
value and equally-weighted returns, NMC and ONCE firms earn significantly higher 
market-adjusted returns than LEN and PER firms, and earn significantly higher three-
factor and four-factor adjusted returns than LEN, PER and REV firms. Except the four-
factor adjusted returns, no differences are observed between NMC and ONCE firms.  
Among the three groups classified by factor and cluster analyses, LEN and PER firms 
earn higher three-factor and four-factor value adjusted returns than REV firms, and LEN 
firms earn higher three-factor and four-factor equally-weighted returns than PER firms. 
Despite the short period and relatively small sample size (26% of the whole sample), the 
first period from 1991 to 1994 still shows differences between NMC & ONCE firms, on 
the one hand,  and  LEN, PER and REV firms, on the on the other, as well as differences 
among LEN, PER and REV firms, corroborating the previous findings of this study.   
                                              
9
 In the period 1991 to 1994, the REV group consists of 27 firms while ONCE, LEN and PER groups 
consist of 168, 309 and 87 firms.  
10
 The usual method for testing method validity is to split a given sample into two random samples and run 
the same analysis on both samples. Since my splitting is not random, the validation test may be biased.   
11
 The two periods test can’t be applied to the six consecutive mandatory contribution (MCX) firm groups 
because MC5 and MC6 are not defined in the 1991 to 1994 period.  
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Table 30. Value-Weighted and Equally-Weighted Monthly Returns (VWRET and EWRET) Adjusted by Market, Three-Factors and Four-
Factors for NMC, ONCE, LEN, PER and REV Firm Groups for Periods 1991 to 1994 and 1995 to 2005.   
 
NMC represents firms with no mandated contribution. ONCE includes firms that made only one mandated contribution during the s ample period. LEN, 
PER and REV are groups identified from factor and cluster analyses. T-statistics for the various risk-adjusted mean returns are presented in parentheses. 
 
Panel A. 1991 to 1994 Period. 
     VWRET          EWRET     
  NMC ONCE LEN PER REV   NMC ONCE LEN PER REV 
     Market Adjusted Returns     
Mean 0.0057 0.0072 0.0048
aB
 0.0038
aB
 0.0053  0.0065 0.0065 0.0048
Ab
 0.0038
Ab
 0.0050 
 (13.000) (7.555) (6.542) (2.526) (2.655)  (14.826) (6.845) (6.646) (2.532) (2.657) 
Median 0.0031 0.0039 0.0025 0.0015 0.0013  0.0036 0.0033 0.0026 0.0015 0.0013 
            
    Three-Factor Adjusted Returns    
Mean 0.0065 0.0084 0.0044
A B
 0.0050
B
 0.0017
A BCD
  0.0020 0.0023 0.0001
A B
 -0.0035
ABC
 -0.0018
 AB
 
 (14.682) (8.796) (5.979) (3.316) (0.540)  (4.719) (2.423) (0.193) (-2.368) (-1.062) 
Median 0.0041 0.0049 0.0020 0.0025 -0.0069  -0.0005 0.0000 -0.0021 -0.0046 -0.0037 
            
    Four-Factor Adjusted Returns    
Mean 0.0067 0.0103
A
 0.0048
A B
 0.0047
aB
 0.0009
A BCD
  0.0027 0.0038 0.0013
A B
 -0.0018
ABc
 -0.0008
aB
 
 (15.190) (10.747) (6.645) (3.078) (0.281)  (6.301) (3.968) (1.846) (-1.218) (-0.200) 
Median 0.0042 0.0072 0.0025 0.0015 -0.0069   0.0003 0.0012 -0.0007 -0.0030 -0.0033 
 
A(a)
 indicates the mean is significantly different from NMC firms at 0.01 (0.05) level. 
B(b)
 indicate the mean is significantly different from ONCE firms at 0.01 (0.05) level. 
C(c)
 Indicate the mean is significantly different from LEN firms at 0.01 (0.05) level. 
D(d)
 indelicate the mean is significantly different from PER firms at 0.01 (0.05) level. 
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Table 30.  (Continued) 
 
Panel B. 1995 to 2005 Period.  
     VWRET           EWRET     
  NMC ONCE LEN PER REV   NMC ONCE LEN PER REV 
            Market Adjusted Returns         
Mean 0.0049 0.0028
A
 0.0034
A
 0.0006
A BC
 -0.0043
ABCD
  0.0061 0.0045
a
 0.0031
Ab
 -0.0008
ABC
 -0.0012
ABC
 
 (16.270) (4.203) (6.869) (0.541) -(1.995)  (20.284) (6.874) (6.245) (-0.712) (-0.564) 
Median 0.0025 0.0006 0.0020 -0.0001 -0.0076  0.0038 0.0022 0.0017 -0.0016 -0.0047 
            
        Three-Factor Adjusted Returns    
Mean 0.0040 0.0041 0.0011
A B
 -0.0017
ABC
 -0.0075
ABCD
  0.0010 -0.0003 -0.0022
AB
 -0.0073
ABC
 -0.0055
ABC
 
 (13.065) (6.262) (2.197) (-1.592) (-3.527)  (3.459) (-0.443) (-4.417) (-7.065) (-2.614) 
Median 0.0013 0.0019 -0.0004 -0.0023 -0.0108  -0.0017 -0.0025 -0.0038 -0.0095 -0.0094 
            
     Four-Factor Adjusted Returns     
Mean 0.0036 0.0056
A
 0.0005
A B
 -0.0027
ABC
 -0.0033
ABC
  0.0029 0.0022 0.0006
Ab
 -0.0045
ABC
 -0.0044
ABC
 
 (11.905) (8.460) (1.088) (-2.575) (-1.530)  (9.576) (3.346) (1.276) (-4.247) (-2.026) 
Median 0.0010 0.0033 -0.0008 -0.0033 -0.0050   0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0007 -0.0060 -0.0065 
 
A(a)
 indicates the mean is significantly different from NMC firms at 0.01 (0.05) level. 
B(b)
 indicate the mean is significantly different from ONCE firms at 0.01 (0.05) level. 
C(c)
 Indicate the mean is significantly different from LEN firms at 0.01 (0.05) level. 
D(d)
 indelicate the mean is significantly different from PER firms at 0.01 (0.05) level. 
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Panel B reports the risk-adjusted monthly returns of the five firm groups from the 
three models for the second period (1995 to 2005).  The results show that NMC and 
ONCE firms earn higher risk adjusted returns than LEN, PER and REV firms, and LEN 
firms earn higher risk adjusted returns than PER and REV firms. Between NMC and 
ONCE firms, only one of four differences for three-factor and four-factor adjusted returns 
is significant, showing that NMC and ONCE firms generally do not earn different three-
factor and four-factor adjusted returns.  In comparison with the results in Panel A, the 
results in Panel B show clearer differences between LEN, PER and REV firms. 
Specifically, LEN firms earn higher returns than PER and REV firms for all risk-adjusted 
models and PER firms earn higher value-weighted market and three-factor adjusted 
returns than REV firms.  
Overall, the split sample test shows that the results are consistent in the two 
periods and the change in the MC requirement rule has little effects on the findings of this 
study. 
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CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The impact of pension information on market valuation is an important issue that 
has not to date been explored in depth.  This research seeks to investigate how the 
market, analysts and institutional investors respond to mandatory pension contributions to 
better understand the utilization of pension information.       
Using plan-level pension 5500 schedule B  data along with Compustat, CRSP, 
I/B/E/S, and institutional holdings data, I find that firms that make mandatory 
contributions frequently have lower market returns than those that make mandated 
contributions for shorter periods. Using factor and cluster analyses based on mandatory 
contribution characteristics, I classify firms with two or more years of mandated 
contributions into three groups: Lenient (LEN), Perpetual (PER) and Revert (REV) firms 
that differ in terms of their MC patterns and the severity of their funding shortfall.  
All risk-adjusted returns show PER and REV firms earn significantly lower 
returns from the first quarter to five years after the first MC occurrence. I also find that 
market is most negatively surprised by the MC implications for PER and REV firms. 
Analysts tend to overestimate MC firms, and subsequently make negative revisions when 
additional information becomes available. The magnitudes of forecast errors and forecast 
revisions increase for firms with a more protracted MC string, and more complex MC 
patterns.  
Additionally, I find that institutional investors seem to incorporate MC 
information into their holdings two years after the first MC occurrence.  The holdings 
vary among the MC firm groups depending on investment class and style.  Quasi-
indexers, large value and large growth investors can differentiate between REV firms and 
other MC group firms and hold substantial fewer shares in REV firms. Transient 
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investors also reduce holdings in REV firms two years after the first MC occurrence.   
This paper makes several contributions to existing literature. I demonstrate that 
the impact of the MC requirement on market returns depends on the nature of the MC 
patterns exhibited by different firms. Firms with one year of MC payments are not 
viewed any differently from firms with no MC requirement during the sample period. I 
classify MC firms into groups based on factor and cluster analyses to capture different 
MC characteristics and show that market responses vary systematically across the 
identified groups of MC firms.  I also provide evidence that analysts take MC into 
consideration but are unable to fully understand the implications of different MC 
patterns, resulting in larger forecast errors for some MC group firms than for others. 
Finally, I show that institutional investors take MC into consideration two years after the 
firm’s first MC occurrence. Institutional investors react to the four MC firm groups 
differently depending on the investing class and style.    
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